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Abstract 
Information Systems outsourcing practices have been investigated for more 
than 30 years in the literature. Because of the complicated issues involved, 
research has examined outsourcing issues from different perspectives. Few 
analytical frameworks have been used to understand how the decisions are 
made. To enrich the literature, we examine the IS outsourcing research with 
the objective to consolidate the findings and thereby develop a comprehensive 
framework in order to get an overview on IS outsourcing activities. 
Our framework identifies all the important factors when making the 
outsourcing decisions from four major areas- Economy, Vendor Issues, 
Strategy and Managerial Concerns. These four areas are interrelated and can 
be regarded as the major aspects in outsourcing IS activities. Indeed, the 
framework can also be facilitated as a tool for planning outsourcing activities 
and can be used to outline several research problems that have been rarely 
addressed in the literature. 
With the help of our framework, the mathematical models are proposed to 
evaluate the outsourcing decisions systematically in both the single and 
multiple vendor cases. Our quantitative models would implement some of the 
crucial factors suggested in the framework and make the estimation that may 
implicitly or explicitly influence the outsourcing costs. In our model 
formulation, we assume that cost efficiency is the most critical factor in 
evaluating outsourcing decisions and our goal is to achieve the IS functions 
with the minimum outsourcing or insourcing costs. Our model is unique in 
i 
many ways. For instance, it takes the costs of insourcing, outsourcing, and 
coordination into consideration simultaneously. Further, the inter-related 
nature of tasks is addressed; and the performance of a vendor is also included. 
The problem is formulated as a mixed integer programming model. Numerical 
examples are provided to illustrate the decision models for both vendor cases 
and solved with the Excel Solver which eases the communication. Managerial 
implications from our model are discussed and different outsourcing situations 
are explored such that managers will recognize the appropriate strategies that 
are most beneficial to their companies. 
Lastly, some potential research topics are suggested which may give the 
researchers and practitioners some new insights in the future research 
endeavor. Since there is no representative model to reflect outsourcing 
phenomena, this research attempts to shed a light on this complicated issues. 
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Outsourcing reflects the use of third party facilities to perform the 
organizational activities. It covers a wide range of functions: from support 
related such as IS hardware and software maintenance to strategy related such 
as IS planning and development. IS outsourcing involves the organizational 
arrangement instituted for obtaining IS products and services (Hirschheim and 
Dibbem 2002). Loh and Venkatraman (1992) define it as “the significant 
contribution by external vendors in the physical and/or human resources 
associated with the entire or specific components of the IT infrastructure in 
the user organization." 
IS outsourcing began in 1954 when General Electric Corp. contracted with 
Arther Anderson and Univac (Klepper and Jones 1998). In the 1960s, the 
computer facilities were very expensive and large; companies had to invest 
heavily not only on the facilities but also the controlled environments for 
operation. They outsourced their operational and facility management service 
to avoid the intensive investment (Teng et al. 1995). In the 1970s，there was a 
rapidly increasing demand for software development (Kelter and Walstrom 
1993). Standardization of the system software such as database management 
and communication monitor became very popular (Lee et al. 2002). Owing to 
the lack of IS personnel, managers outsourced their software development 
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through contract programming. However, in the 1980s, IS functions were 
regarded as strategic issues to support vertical integration. Due to the 
introduction of the low cost PCs in the market, companies purchased the 
standard equipment and system software and were able to manage their IS 
functions in-house. Nevertheless, in the 1990s, companies shifted their 
interests back to outsourcing because of the fast growing technology. They 
sought for total solution on IS asset management and were willing to transfer 
their IS responsibility to third party. Some companies acquired for on-site 
facilities management where vendor managed their service at clients' 
locations. Today, outsourcing services were not limited to the acquisition of 
hardware or software; they also involved strategic operation such as system 
integration which includes network management and telecommunications 
(Lee et al. 2002). 
On the other hand, the mode of IS outsourcing activities has undergone a big 
changes over the past decades. From the 1960s to 1980s，IS outsourcing 
focused on the acquisition of the developed technology and was considered as 
commodity. Companies often treated it as a simple "make or buy" decision 
(Buchowicz, 1991; Buck-Lew, 1992, Welch and Nayak, 1992). In the 1990s， 
IS outsourcing activities include also the management services of IS which 
may be strategic to an outsourcing company. Yang and Huang (2000) claim 
that external service providers would take over part or all of IS functions in an 
organization. Thus the external providers would take the responsibility and the 
control over the IS functions as well as employees and part of the computer 
facilities. In fact, the notion of outsourcing has been shifted from parts, 
components to service-based economy. Nowadays, outsourcing vendors 
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provide a greater range and depth services, and assume the management 
responsibility and risk. The nature of the relationship between the partners in 
outsourcing is changing (Grover et al. 1996). 
As a matter of fact, since Kodak successfully outsourced all their IS functions 
to IBM in 1989，IS outsourcing became popular. Both large and small firms 
gradually followed Kodak's example (Caldwell 1995). Big firms such as 
General Dynamics, Delta Airlines, Continental Bank, Xerox, McDonnell 
Douglas, Chevron, Dupont，JP Morgan and Bell South (Hirshheim and 
Dibbem, 2002; Lacity and Willcocks, 1995) signed long term contracts 
worth multi-million dollars ("mega-deals") with the outsiders and have 
successfully outsourced their IS services. In fact, outsourcing has become one 
of the solutions to IS management problem to them. Dataquest noted that 
since 1989 outsourcing deals have been over 100 of mega-deals (Young 2000). 
According to International Data Corporation report, it estimated that the actual 
global IS outsourcing spending would expand from US$40 billion in 1996 to 
US$71 billion in 2003 representing a growth rate of 12.2% per annum 
(Murphy, Ker & Ross 1999). Also, the Dataquest report showed that IS 
outsourcing industry revenue would jump from US$194 billion in 1999 to 
US$531 billion by 2002 (Young 2000). An Outsourcing Institute's survey of 
1200 companies found that 50% of these companies spent more than US$5 
million on IS outsourcing or evaluating the outsourcing options (Casale, 
2001). 
Although there are distinct advantages or benefits such as cost reduction or 
significant revenue improvement, there are failing outsourcing activities. 
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Researchers claimed that companies were reluctant to disclose their failure in 
IS outsourcing due to the negative effects on their company reputation. In fact, 
IS outsourcing is not determined to be a success; unsuccessful outsourcing 
deals led the companies to seek for other outsourcing options (Input 1999c). 
According to a white paper from Toronto-based IT consultancy Compass, 
about one quarter of outsourcing practices failed in the first year and half of 
the outsourcing companies renegotiated their contracts and switched to other 
vendors (Maclnnis [2003]). Also, a 1995 report by The Standish Group 
International Inc. showed that only 16.2 percent of the outsourcing projects 
were succeeded and completed on time and on budget. More than 31 percent 
of which were failed and cancelled (Haubold [2000]). Perhaps, companies 
often fail in outsourcing due to the lack of decision models to help managers 
analyze the outsourcing decision systematically (Alpar and Saharia, 1995; 
Chaundry et al.,1992; Reponen，1993). In fact, managers dissatisfied with the 
outsourcing relationship and experienced disappointment since they were not 
familiar with the outsourcing environment and often overestimated the 
performance outcomes from the vendors (Laabs，1998). 
1.1 Research Focus 
This research attempts to structure the literature by developing a 
comprehensive framework in order to get an overview on IS outsourcing. 
Thereby, with the help of the framework, a mathematical model will be 
proposed to evaluate the outsourcing decisions with the single and multiple 
vendor approach. Our comprehensive framework will first highlight the 
importance on outsourcing and distinguish all the major aspects and 
determinants that may influence the outsourcing costs. Then, our quantitative 
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models would implement some of the curial factors suggested in the 
framework and make the estimation that may implicitly or explicitly influence 
the outsourcing costs. In our model, we assume that cost efficiency is the most 
critical factor in evaluating outsourcing decision and our goal is to achieve the 
IS functions with the minimum outsourcing or insourcing costs. Our 
quantitative models would find an optimal solution to the assignment of jobs 
with the consideration of the insourcing cost, outsourcing cost, the extra 
manufacturing cost due to performance of the vendor and the coordination 
cost that may exist due to the inter-dependence among the insourcing and 
outsourcing jobs. In fact, the decision-making model will help us to identify 
which jobs should be outsourced with the lowest cost and less effect on others. 
Although the comprehensive framework give a full view on outsourcing, not 
all the factors will be considered in our decision model since outsourcing 
involves wide range of complicated issues and the real life is complex. This 
research only focuses on outsourcing with the minimal costs. Since the main 
consideration for the managers to outsource is the access to increased 
knowledge and technology but not the cost, the model may not reflect the 
reality and be irrelevant to the real practices. Yet, the model is logical and 
realistic and it suggests ways to quantify the implicit costs. As there is no 
definite answer to outsource or not, however, there will only be an optimal 
solution to a model that would fulfill all the requirements suggested and 
achieve the tasks. Since there is no representative model to reflect outsourcing 
phenomena, this research attempts to shed a light on this complicated issues. 





A number of researchers and practitioners have investigated and analyzed the 
outsourcing decisions for more than 30 years. The literature was extensive and 
determined outsourcing from different perspectives. There is no common 
definition on IS outsourcing. Yang and Huang (2000) found that the reasons 
for IS outsourcing market are mostly cost reduction, increase in productivity, 
and adoption of the changes in fast growing technologies. Alternatively, Vacca 
(2000) suggests that the advantages of outsourcing are controlling budget, an 
easy access to skilled personnel, improvement in IT service as well as 
customers service and risk sharing with vendors. On the other hand, 
Venkatesan (1992) proposed a generic method to classify the IS function as a 
commodity or strategic. He suggested that the outsourcers should outsource 
those commodity operations and keep the strategic functions in-house. 
Lacity and Wilcocks (2001) suggested that there were two phenomena of the 
IS outsourcing market. First, companies concentrate on their core competence 
and treat IS as a non-core activity. Also, the managers believe that vendors 
would provide better technological services as well as expertise than internal 
departments. Second, since IS functions bring unforeseen values, companies 
treat IS as an overhead; an essential cost but can be minimized. Therefore, due 
to these two main reasons, the managers outsource their IS functions and sign 
mega-deals and long term contracts. 
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However, undermining the importance of the IS functions would often lead to 
the lack of control and power over the strategic IS assets of the clients. Also, 
Lacity and Hirschheim (1993) argued that the classification on commodity or 
strategic service was not appropriate since managers could mistakenly identify 
the critical service as commodity or commodity as the strategic functions. 
Yang and Huang (2000) also argued that the outsourcing decision 
determinants (such as transaction cost, and strategic or commodity) were too 
narrow to determine whether the system could be outsourced or insourced. 
Moreover, ineffective and improper outsourcing strategies could damage the 
firm or even lead to the shutdown of the firm. Companies are often required to 
spend huge amount of money to extricate themselves from outsourcing 
contracts and reorganize their internal IS capability (Lacity and Wilcocks, 
2001). 
Surprisingly, only few researchers used systematic ways to evaluate 
outsourcing decisions. Yang and Huang (2000) used Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) to develop an outsourcing decision model which included five 
factors- management, strategy, economics, technology and quality. The model 
helps the users to structure the outsourcing problem with all the elements or 
factors that may be important to the decision. It first constructs a hierarchic 
structure by decomposing the problem into several sub-problems and users 
can rank the elements according to their judgment. By using the pairwise 
comparisons, a square matrix is derived. The eigenvector can be computed 
from the largest eigenvalue and then the priorities of the elements of the 
hierarchy can be found. This method can provide the users a systematic way 
to choose and analyze factors or attributes easily from the hierarchy and gives 
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the priorities of which jobs should be outsourced. 
Udo (1996) also agreed that AHP was ideal to handle the qualitative 
outsourcing decision systematically. He proposed that an outsourcing decision 
model should be viewed by four categories -strategic importance, vendor 
issues, customers' interests, employee's interests in order to analyze the 
decision. He also suggested that other variables can be added to the hierarchy 
which is dependent on the particular needs of the company. 
However, the AHP method does not provide enough mathematical technique 
to evaluate the complicated decision-making process and examine the 
tradeoffs among the outsourcing decisions. It only decides which job function 
is suitable to outsource but it is insufficient and inefficient to include the 
vendor selection process or the control over the outsourcing process and does 
not provide any information on estimating the costs that may be generated for 
the outsourcing deals. In fact, AHP fails to give a complete analysis for the 
making the outsourcing decisions. 
Data Envelopment Analysis is another popular method for decision making 
process. DEA was first introduced by Chames, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) 
which is known as the CCR ratio. They generalized the single output to single 
input ratio to multiple outputs and inputs to measure the efficiency of the 
Decision Making Units (DMUs). The DMUs are assumed to perform the 
similar tasks in a production system that consume multiple inputs to produce 
multiple outputs although in varying amounts. A number of extended models 
such as BBC models (Banker, Chames and Cooper, 1984) and FHD models 
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(Tulkens, 1993) have been studied based on DEA for different applications on 
decision analysis. Yet, all these DEA models have the same objective to 
measure the relative efficiency for each DMU by comparing its input and 
output data in order to identify the one with best practices. Moreover, DEA 
can be used to analyze the multiple outputs and multiple inputs based on 
performance data without preassigned weights. Indeed, it can handle both 
discretionary and non-discretionary factors and provide the efficiency 
measures to establish benchmarks for monitoring and performance 
improvement. 
In fact, there are lots of DEA applications to measure the efficiency in a 
variety of contexts. For example, Weber and Desai (1996), Weber et al. (1998), 
Zhu (2004) developed the efficiency -based negotiation models for vendor 
evaluation and negotiation. They measured the relative efficiencies of the 
vendors (DMUs) by comparing the important vendor attributes such as price, 
quality, delivery performance and customization so that the buyer can select 
the best vendor and negotiate the ones with low efficiency. Paradi and 
Shaffinit (2003) used DEA to evaluate the performance of the two branches in 
a Canadian Bank so as to establish the benchmarks of the performance level. 
Also, researchers such as Sherman and Gold (1985)，Schaffmit et al. (1997) 
and Berger and Humphrey (1997) used DEA for evaluating the bank branches 
activities in order to find the best practice frontier. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, researchers seldom used DEA to evaluate the outsourcing 
decisions but the outsourcing options. Yet, both DEA and AHP are inefficient 
to provide the quantitative analysis of the outsourcing process. 
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On the other hand, Patterson and Rolland (2002) developed a bias-free 
decision model to aid E-business outsourcing decision using linear 
programming. They defined a Capacitated Business Process Outsourcing 
problem (CBPO) which was to find the assignment of processes to providers 
such that the total operating expenses was minimized. The model formulation 
required the assessment of the risks and control issues related to the business 
process and the potential service provider, which could be either the vendor or 
the client itself. It also showed an optimal and comprehensive solution 
methodology for the outsourcing decision. 
Nevertheless, the prior decision models for outsourcing process might still be 
insufficient since they lack proper risk analysis. As a matter of fact, companies 
often experience undesirable outcomes or failure since most decision models 
are unable to identify the possible risk and uncertainty that may arise during 
outsourcing. They often ignore the transaction costs, the extra hidden costs or 
other managerial concerns which make it difficult to make the most favorable 
decision. 
2.1 Theoretical Models 
Theories have been developed in explaining and understanding the 
outsourcing phenomena from three different perspectives: strategic, economic 
and social. Although these theories are different in terms of orientations, 
focuses and resources, they all aimed to guide the managers in 
decision-making and predict the possible outcomes from their pre-defined 
attributes such as the amount of organization's resources, asset specificity and 
frequency of the contracts (Lee at el, 2002). 
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Strategic perspective such as resource-based theory and resource-dependency 
theory (Barney, 1986; Cheon et al, 1995; Daft 1992; Wemerfelt, 1984) 
proposes to formulate and implement the strategies in order to achieve the 
performance goal. They focus on maximizing the firm's internal resources and 
capabilities, and obtaining the critical external resources in order to survive 
and stay competitive. Economic view such as transaction cost theory and 
agency-cost theory explains the characteristics of the transactions and 
examines the governance of economics agents in the transactions in order to 
achieve the economy of scales (Hallen et al., 1991; Lacity and Hirschheim, 
1993; Williamson, 1979). Instead of focusing on strategies and economy, the 
social perspective such as social exchange theory and power-political theory 
(Klepper, 1994; Lee and Kim, 1999) analyzes the outsourcing relationship 
between an outsourcer and a service provider. They believed that the power 
and political tactic would play an important role in outsourcing decisions. 
(Pfeffer，1981) 
2.1.1 Transaction Cost Theory 
Among these theories, Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) is a relatively 
well-established and widely-used theory in analyzing different decision 
problems. Examples of applications include constructing an efficient 
administration (Armour and Teece, 1978), integrating the boundaries of the 
firms (Williamson, 1981，Stuckey and White, 1993) and making make-buy 
decisions (Walker and Weber, 1984). In outsourcing setting, Ngwenyama and 
Bryson (1999) developed a decision model to evaluate the outsourcing options 
based on the TCT. 
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As mentioned, TCT is an economic theory of analyzing the characteristics of 
transactions and determining the most efficient and cost-effective mode in 
governing them. Williamson (1979) claimed that all the transactions are 
economized on the sum of production and transaction costs which include 
monitoring costs, set-up costs and coordination costs. He argued that 
transaction costs are central to the study of economics. Since transaction costs 
in different economic activities are different, Williamson (1979) identified an 
examination of alternative institutional modes for organizing the transactions. 
He defined three critical dimensions to characterize the transactions, (1) 
uncertainty, (2) the frequency of the transactions recurring, (3) the degree to 
which the investments are transaction-specific. For simplicity, Williamson 
assumed that uncertainty exists in some intermediate degree for all the 
transactions and a framework in Figure 1 was developed for matching the 
governance structure with the commercial transactions according to the 
frequency of the transactions and the crucial investment attribute- investment 
specificity. 
Investment Characteristics 
Non-specific Mixed Idiosyncratic 
ro 3 i 
C (D g' I 
.2 g ••g Trilateral Governance 
3 I 2 (Neoclassical Contracting) 
§ � i  
a- 一 I 
^ S I w Bilateral 丨 Unified 
§ 5 ro Governance ； Governance o ^ o ！ 
一 (Relationail Contracting) 
I I • I 
Figure 2.1 Governance Structure developed bv Williamson (1979) 
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Two frequency and three investment specificity categories are identified in the 
institutional framework (Figure 2.1). Different governance structures with 
commercial contracting are proposed for a variety of transactions. 
Idiosyncratic and recurrent transactions should be vertically integrated 
whereas other transactions should adopt the market governance with different 
contractual relations which depend on the nature of the transactions. Indeed, 
Williamson suggested that an appropriate contracting would prevent excessive 
transaction cost. 
From the framework, all the non-specific transactions (occasional or recurrent) 
should be governed by the market with classical contracting. These 
transactions usually pose few hazards and are easily replaced by other vendors. 
Lowry (1976) claimed that these standardized transactions corresponded to 
the concept of sales rather than contract since the identity of the buyers and 
sellers is of negligible importance; and mostly, the legal rules apply to govern 
the transactions. 
Semi-specific and specific transactions require specialized physical and 
human capital. These investments are either non-transferable or transferable at 
a very high cost to alternative suppliers. Therefore, these specific transactions 
would require highly specific governing structures and incentives schemes for 
trading will be structured through completion of the transaction to induce the 
high performance of the vendors. Williamson suggested that the mixed and 
idiosyncratic items which occur occasionally should adopt trilateral 
governance with neoclassical contracting. He argued that the market has 
superior economies of scale on production costs due to the occasional 
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behavior. The third party assistance is required to evaluate the performance, 
resolve the disputes and safeguard transactions against opportunism. 
The mixed and recurrent transaction would then adopt the bilateral 
governance where the autonomy of the parties is required. The buyer and 
seller conduct a mutual, follow-on agreement. Also, both parties would have 
the incentive to sustain the relationship. They are declared to some admissible 
dimensions for adjustment such that flexibility is provided under certain terms 
and conditions. 
The idiosyncratic and recurrent transactions required extensively specialized 
human and physical assets and they should be removed from the market and 
integrated vertically since the cost of the specialized governing structure 
would be recovered due to the recurrent nature. Besides, the economies of 
scale can be fully realized by the buyer. Moreover, vertical integration does 
not require any inter-firm agreement such that the quantity or price adjustment 
would be more easily adapted which enhance the flexibility and profitability 
of the transactions. 
2.1.2 Limitations of the TCT 
However, since IS outsourcing is a specific and complicated transaction, the 
TCT seems not to be sufficient in explaining its specified governing structure. 
In fact, the governing structure on IS outsourcing transactions could not be 
determined simply from the economic perspective and by two basis 
investment attributes only. 
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TCT governance framework only clarifies the frequency and the investment 
specificity of the transactions. It ignores other critical factors involving the IS 
outsourcing transactions such as the importance of vendor selection process, 
the strategies and coordination of the purchasing functions which make the 
classification of the transactions incomplete. Also, researchers such as Lee et 
al. (2002)，Walker and Weber (1984) claimed that TCT failed to consider other 
important attributes such as strategy factors and the inter-relationship of the 
outsourcing decisions that would affect the organization. The complicated IS 
outsourcing transactions would be viewed by more critical dimensions in 
order to examine a more adapted governing structure. 
Lacity and Willcocks (1995) claimed that although transaction cost theory 
provides a logical, consistent and unique way in viewing transactions, 
however, they found the major difficulties in language ambiguity and 
dimensions of analysis when explaining the outsourcing decisions. They also 
claimed that different people may have different interpretations of the terms 
such as asset specificity, degree of uncertainty which would make the TCT 
difficult to operationalize. Besides, the term "transaction" may be too big as a 
unit of analysis for outsourcing decisions. Lacity and Willcocks believed that 
the sourcing decisions not be treated as one "transaction" because they were 
associated with one contract. Since one sourcing contract may involve 
different information technology functions which can be asset specific or 
non-specific, the treatment of one "transaction" may be inappropriate. 
Nevertheless, TCT only gives a limited view on explaining outsourcing 
transactions which is not sufficient and efficient enough for deciding this 
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complicated issue. Also, due to the dis-organized literature and the lack of 
completed view on IS outsourcing, we will introduce a comprehensive 
framework to view the outsourcing phenomena not only from the economic 
perspective but also with other critical dimensions such as vendor selection, 
strategy and managerial concerns. Indeed, the framework will give a 
well-defined and organized analysis in explaining outsourcing relations. And 
it is probably a good source in planning and analyzing the outsourcing activity 
which may lead to a cost-effective and successful transaction. The 
infrastructure of the IS outsourcing framework will be developed and its 




Since IS outsourcing often involves a huge amount of resources and bears 
long-term strategic impacts, managers have to take all the concerns seriously 
before making this critical decision. In fact, most researchers or practitioners 
have studied how to outsource their IS activities effectively and efficiently. 
They used different methods to decide whether outsourcing is cost-effective. 
The qualitative work mostly provides researchers' own viewpoints on 
outsourcing; and is either conceptual or empirical (Weber, Current and Benton 
1990). Many are based on a survey or an interview of the managers. Although 
the ‘population，might be different, these studies could still identify the 
possible factors in the importance of outsourcing. Researchers (such as 
Ngwenyama and Bryson 1999，Lee, Huynh, Kwok and Pi 2002) analyzed 
outsourcing acts from different perspectives such as economic, technological 
and strategic. They found out the determinants and major factors of IS 
outsourcing decision and identified the undesirable outcomes. On the other 
hand, some researchers used the linear weighting models or mathematical 
models to quantify some of these factors in order to evaluate the outsourcing 
options. Kim (2000) used the optimal control model to evaluate the 
capabilities of the vendors. Narasimhan and StoynofF (1986)，Pan (1989) and 
Current and Weber (1994) used the linear models to optimize the vendor 
selection problem. Weber and Desai (1996)，Weber et al. (1998)，Zhu (2004) 
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developed the efficiency -based negotiation models for vendor evaluation and 
negotiation based on DBA. 
3.1 Motivation 
However, the stated work simply identified determinants or discussed the 
possible outsourcing options. Besides, all the stated reviews are extensive. 
Although their objective was about how to manage outsourcing cost 
effectively, the literature were still rather diverse and showed no coherence. 
Some suggested that coordination and communication are the major concerns 
in outsourcing while others claimed that vendor selection is the most 
important aspect. Also, the established theory such as Transaction Cost theory 
only provides a limited view in explaining outsourcing decision which is not 
sufficient in analyzing outsourcing practices. In fact, very few articles used 
systematic or direct approach to define outsourcing decision which makes it 
difficult to follow the outsourcing acts. Thereby, this research will first 
structure the literature such that readers could analyze the outsourcing with 
the categorization of all the major aspects and determinants that may involve. 
As mentioned, the main objective of all these literature was more about cost 
reduction. Most companies outsource their activities because they can save 
money and achieve the economy of scales. However, managers often only 
consider the production cost before making the outsourcing decision. The 
production cost is only the direct purchasing price or the internal production 
cost which is the expenditure for the purchasing function and does not 
necessarily reflect the actual cost of doing the business. The cost governing 
the activities such as bargaining cost and opportunism cost may exceed the 
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direct purchase savings. Moreover, the cost governing the transactions or the 
hidden cost associated with inadequate quality, unsatisfactory performance, 
inefficient management would often be dominant in the actual cost and has to 
be investigated before making the outsourcing decision. 
This section will first show a comprehensive framework to categorize the 
determinants and factors that may influence the governing or transaction cost 
in IS outsourcing. The goal of the framework is to minimize the cost; 
therefore, all the suggested factors can be evaluated into a cost. Also, the 
framework will distinguish the importance of outsourcing and one can study 
this overview to have a whole picture of outsourcing activities. However, this 
is not the only way to view outsourcing decision. Researchers can have 
another viewpoint on this complicated issue. At last, this review will also 
address what other topics that are less emphasized or weak in the literature. 
3.2 The Infrastructure 
Our framework shows that the ‘governing’ or hidden costs could be arisen 
from four different areas and one should consider all the factors involving 
these four categories- economics, managerial concerns, strategy and vendor 
issues before making outsourcing decisions. These four areas are interrelated 
and can be regarded as the major aspects in outsourcing IS activities. The 
chart in figure 3.1 is divided by four sections and each quarter represents its 
respective area. The segments in each quarter represent the factors or 
determinants can be raised from the respective issue. For example, availability, 
performance and compatibility are regarded the major factors arisen from the 
vendor issue in outsourcing the IS activities. The summary of the framework 
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is attached on appendix A. 
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Figure 3.1. The Outsourcing Framework developed 
By Wong and Cheng (2004) 
Economics 
Transaction Cost Theory has been widely used in explaining outsourcing 
decisions. According to the theory, such decisions may be evaluated by the 
sum of transaction cost and production cost, where the transaction cost 
includes all the planning, adapting and monitoring costs. These costs are 
determined by asset specificity and the level of environmental and behavioral 
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uncertainty^ (Williamson. 1979; McFarlan, Warren and Nolan, 1995; Ang and 
Straub，1998). 
Asset Specificity 
Asset specificity is the degree of uniqueness to the human and/or physical 
capital investment. Physical asset specificity is the degree of customization of 
the product or service whereas the human asset specificity is the degree of 
specialized knowledge and capabilities through training which is required for 
the transaction (Lacity and Willcocks, 1995). If the product is asset specific, it 
possesses low value on other transactions. Theory suggests that extra 
governing and monitoring cost will be required for products with high asset 
specificity and uncertainty. Vining and Globerman (1999) also suggested that 
asset specificity was one of the determinants of outsourcing costs. Product 
with high asset specificity often raised the potential in vendors' opportunistic 
behavior due to the special capabilities of the services. Roodhooft and Warlop 
(1999) also argued that decision- makers often ignored the transaction costs in 
buying services from the vendors and suggested that companies should take 
the asset specificity into account when making outsourcing decision. On the 
other hand, Williamson (1979) used two factors, frequency and investment 
specificity to develop a transaction governance structure to help users if they 
should adopt hierarchy choice or market choice. Williamson (1979) claimed 
that if the transaction was idiosyncratic and recurrent, the firm should take the 
hierarchy choice which meant the products should be produced internally and 
‘According to the Transaction Cost Theory, the uncertainty only refers to environmental and 
behavioral uncertainty. Although uncertainty may also involve in other categories such as 
strategic, managerial or vendor issues, the question on this matter is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
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by means of vertical integration. Otherwise, other transactions should choose 
market choice that occurred between the firm and a vendor. 
Environmental and Behavioral Uncertainty 
Environmental uncertainty includes the technology changes and innovations 
whereas behavioral uncertainty regards the potential of vendor's opportunistic 
behavior (Williamson, 1979). Vendor may negotiate changes in the contract 
and demand a higher price than the market price. In fact, opportunism often 
happens in outsourcing contexts due to the distribution of profits. Vining and 
Globerman (1999) suggested that complex goods with difficulty in defining 
the terms and conditions of the transaction usually involve uncertainty. 
Greater uncertainties would induce a higher bargaining cost during the 
contract negotiation. Nywenyama and Bryson (1999) claimed that the 
uncertainties concerning vendors' performance might give rise to a switching 
cost when the vendors were under-performed or failed. Williamson also 
suggested that as uncertainty increases, the governing structure should be 
either changed from market to hierarchy for the recurrent transactions or 
sacrifice the specific design and adopt the more standardized one. 
Vendor Issues 
Most literature concentrates on vendor selection since it is the major aspect on 
outsourcing acts. Evidences showed that purchased products from the vendors 
constituted a large percentage of the total operating cost of the firms (Bender 
et al., 1985). Burton (1988) found that a high technology firm purchased 
material and services which summed up to 80% of the total product costs. 
Therefore, a failure in selection an ‘appropriate，vendor may lead to loss or 
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even shutdown of the firm. In fact, vendor selection process can be very 
complex in outsourcing decisions and can be analyzed both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. However, these methods only suggest which vendors are 
appropriate but are not to be substituted as the cost analysis in outsourcing 
decision. Gregory (1986) suggested that price or cost analysis should be 
conducted after making the supplier selection decision in order to develop the 
firm's negotiation position. Availability, capabilities and performance of the 
vendors would be the determinants in choosing a vendor according to our 
overview. 
Availability 
The numbers of vendor available in the market is critical in making the 
outsourcing decision. Vining and Globerman (1999) suggested that low 
contestable market increased the risk of opportunism since the service was 
hardly replaced and there existed the risk of 'contract breach externalities'. If 
there is only one vendor available in providing the service to the outsourcer, 
there is a potential for the vendor to shirk since there is no other competitors. 
On the other hand, opportunism is reduced in a highly competitive market. In 
fact, greater competition would enhance lower bids, better services and more 
satisfactory performance. 
Capabilities 
Kim (2000) developed an optimal control model and found that outsourcing 
the activities to vendors with higher improvement capabilities would have the 
potential to reduce the future supply cost although they might offer a higher 
price. Soukup (1987) argued that vendors might quote very similar cost but 
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could be very dissimilar in the abilities to accommodate the changes in 
product specification, volumes and delivery schedules. He suggested that the 
key question in vendor selection was whether the supplier would have the 
capabilities to cope with reasonable deviations from the contract. 
Performance 
Another main reason for the firms to outsource is the improvement in the 
performance or quality of the IS functions. Outsourcers should identify if the 
vendors would have the ability to provide new technology and skillful 
workforce. Barthelemy and Geyer (2001) suggested that one of the main 
motivations to IT outsourcing was the high level of performance from the 
vendors. IT suppliers provide better and advanced technology since IT is their 
only entire resource. However, unsatisfactory performance or inability in 
meeting the requirements from the contract would lead to a switching cost of 
the vendor. Wind and Robinson (1968)，Lamberson (1976) and Mazurak 
(1986) used the linear weighing models to weigh the quality of the 
service-providers for vendor selecting process according to their performance 
history. Gregory (1986) used a matrix approach to evaluate the performance of 
the vendors to choose the best vendor. 
Strategy 
Researchers also studied on what strategies the companies should take on 
outsourcing. Bender, Brown, Issac and Shapiro (1985) claimed that an 
appropriate strategy in the purchasing function could mitigate the effects of 
uncertainties. Researchers (such as Williams 1998，Flanagan 1999，Meyer 
2000 and Vacca 2000) have suggested some ways in planning a strategic 
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outsourcing. They mostly agreed that the firms had to focus on their core 
competence and outsourced those services which did not directly add value to 
the organization in order to stay competitive. Full outsourcing was usually not 
recommended and outsourcers should evaluate their outsourcing decision 
periodically. Some researchers suggested that the firm should contract with 
only one vendor for lower coordination cost; others claimed that contracting 
with multiple vendors would motivate the vendors to provide better services. 
Competency 
Most reserchers (such as Williams 1998 and Flanagan 2000) stated that if the 
IS activity is strategic to the firm, outsourcing the IS functions might loss the 
core competency of the firm. They suggested keeping the highly skilled and 
specialized personnel to concentrate on the core competence and outsourced 
the non-core functions. Nywenyama and Bryson (1999) suggested that 
outsourcing might lead to loss of competencies to outsourcers and loss of 
control over the important value chain activities. Vecca (2000) also found that 
the firm might suffer the lack of control in performance, lost of security and 
confidentially of data, inability of reversibility back to in-house, lost of critical 
skills and the unfamiliarity of the enterprise knowledge from vendors. 
Degree of Outsourcing 
Also, the degree of outsourcing is another determinant of strategic issue to 
outsourcing. Companies should identify different IS applications and decide 
whether selectively or totally outsource all their functions. Lacity and 
Willcocks (1998) suggested that selective outsourcing could provide more 
flexibility as well as control over the IS functions and the selection can be 
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based on the role of the IS functions. Total outsourcing persists a higher risk 
in losing the control over the IS activities and losing the competence of the 
firms. Also, full outsourcing may lead to inadequate communications over the 
entire IS process that may create frustrations or confusions to both the client 
and the vendors. On the other hand, Dutta (1996) found that two example 
banks -Banco Comerical Portugues (BCP) and Continental Bank (CB) 
successfully aligned their IT with the business although BCP manages IT in 
house while CB has all of their IT functions outsourced. 
Period of Contracts 
The decision should be evaluated periodically so as to minimize the 
uncertainty. Cole-Gomolski (1999b) claimed that the firms preferred shorter 
IS contracts. In fact, Short term contracts enhance more flexibility and enable 
the firms to choose different vendors to deal with short-term demand, peaks or 
design requirements (Lacity and Hirchheim, 1993). On the other hand, long 
term contracts may give rise to uncertainty due to the unforeseen changes in 
the environment or technological changes. However, Monczka and Trecha 
(1988) suggested that companies could use the contract monitoring tool to 
incorporate with long-term agreement and claimed that long term relationship 
would enhance cost reduction. 
Number of Vendors 
Nywenyama and Bryson (1999) used a mathematical model to find the 
maximum possible profits could be made by two basic outsourcing 
strategies -single and multiple vendors and argued that single vendor 
approach would be superior to the one with multiple vendors. The authors also 
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suggested that the incentive schemes could induce the single vendor to 
achieve higher levels of performance although they might have the potential 
to shirk. On the other hand, multiple vendors might require higher 
coordination cost and managerial efforts. However, Applegate and 
Montealegre (1991) and Cross (1995) argued that single vendor could lead to 
a higher switching cost due to the higher risk in opportunism. Outsourcing 
with multiple vendors would induce a greater competition. Thus, the 
outsourcers have greater bargaining power to lower the purchasing price and 
hence achieve the higher level of performance. Also, multiple vendors 
enhance a higher operational flexibility since different vendors have different 
specialties in their technical services. 
Managerial Concerns 
Since outsourcing vendors provide a greater range and depth services and 
accept the management responsibility and risk, the relationship between the 
clients and vendors has become complicated. Therefore, the management of 
the outsourcing activities is required for an effective and smooth control over 
the process. Besides, a well-designed outsourcing requires managerial efforts 
so as to lead to better coordination and satisfaction both of the employees and 
customers. The management also needs to consider how to maintain a good 
partnership so as to enhance effective outsourcing (Malone and Cowston, 
1994; Van de Ven et al , 1976). 
Coordination (information flow) 
Dutta (1996) suggested that it was the responsibility for senior management to 
link the IT with the business strategy. He found that the active participation 
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and involvement of the business users and managers was required for IT 
planning process. No matter to keep the IT inhouse or outsource to other 
vendors, the information maintenance has to be managed well so as to lead to 
better coordination. 
Malone and Cowston (1994)，Van de Ven et al. (1976) argued that outsourcing 
was likely to increase the degree in uncertainty and complexity, managing 
interdependence and establishing a strong co-ordination between the vendors 
and clients was important to accomplish the tasks. On the other hand, Hendry 
(1995) also claimed that outsourcing could lead to "the loss of shared 
understanding and experience that might threaten the ability of a company to 
coordinate its activities effectively and nurture its core competence." 
Coordination is an important factor for coherent strategic development. In fact, 
the internal staff already has a good understanding of the business and a sense 
of continuity. They would have a better understanding of their own culture, 
strategies and politics. Moreover, they would share the same interest whereas 
the outsourcing firms would recommend some lucrative administrative system 
which generates more revenues. Furthermore, insourcing could ensure the 
consistency and coordination within the in-house production (Meyer, 2000). 
Partnership (trust) 
Partnership is very similar to the concept of coordination. Goles and Chin 
(2002) claimed that coordination was the management of interdependent 
activities whereas partnership was a kind of co-operation which involved 
participants' acknowledgement and agreement of the outsourcing activities. 
Partnership enhances the firms to co-operate in order to achieve mutual 
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benefits. Lee et al. (2002) argued that the relationship between the client and 
service provider has been changed from contractual to partnership. Due to the 
exchange of valuable resources in outsourcing activities, their relationship are 
based on mutual trust rather than focusing on self-interest only. In fact, the 
authors suggested that the firm should encompass three viewpoints -strategic, 
economic and social for understanding IT outsourcing. They argued that a 
strong partnership would bring a more competitive advantage to both the 
clients and service-providers. 
3.3 Implications 
The suggested framework structures the literature and gives a comprehensive 
view of outsourcing decisions from four different areas- economy, vendor 
selection, strategy and managerial concerns. Besides, it also gives a completed 
solution for planning purposes. It categorizes the determinants and factors of 
outsourcing that might implicitly influence the outsourcing cost. Managers 
should take all the suggested considerations before the critical 
decision-making process to ensure success. Bryce and Useen (1998) 
suggested that a well designed and well-managed outsourcing could reduce 
the operating cost and enhance the competency and often be succeeded in the 
market. 
3.4 Limitations of the framework 
However, these determinants in the framework do not help in making decision 
of whether to outsource or insource. The framework only provides a 
preparation and selection process. A proper outsourcing decision should be 
evaluated by the cost analysis after planning in order to achieve cost 
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effectiveness. Yang and Huang (2000) also argued that the only considerations 
of the determinants such as transaction costs and strategic or commodities 
characteristic would be too narrow to make outsourcing decisions. In fact, 
most literature only identified the options, costs and implications which are 
not sufficient to make decisions. Some of which used the mathematical 
models only to evaluate the outsourcing options such as vendor selections but 
not decisions. Surprisingly, there are only few articles evaluated this 
complicated decision in a systematic way 
Some researchers (such as Yang and Huang, 2000 and Udo, 1996) used linear 
weighing models such as Analytic Hierarchy Process to evaluate the 
outsourcing decision by weighing the importance on the determinants 
according to the management's experience. Yang and Huang (2000) used AHP 
to develop an outsourcing decision model which included five factors-
management, strategy, economics, technology and quality. This model gave 
users a systematic way to choose and analyze factors and attributes easily. It 
also gave the priorities of which jobs should be outsourced. 
As far as concerned, only one paper was considered to evaluate outsourcing 
decision using mathematical approach. Patterson and Rolland (2002) 
developed a bias-free decision model to aid E-business outsourcing process 
using linear programming. They defined a Capacitated Business Process 
Outsourcing problem (CBPO) which is to find the assignment of processes to 
providers such that the total operating expenses is minimized. The model 
formulation required the assessment of the risks and control issues related to 
the business process and the potential service provider, which can be either the 
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vendor or the client itself. It also showed an optimal and comprehensive 
solution methodology for the outsourcing decision. 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
Our outsourcing framework identifies not only the main considerations and 
aspects the clients need to concern when planning the outsourcing decisions 
but also demonstrates the future research directions (will be discussed in 
Chapter 6) and identifies the areas that are rarely addressed in the literature. 
Few researchers examine the possible risks and uncertainty that may arise 
during outsourcing (such as coordination of jobs and vendor selection) which 
have not been emphasized in the literature. 
A well-planned and organized outsourcing would reduce the level of risks and 
likely be successful in the business (Soukup, 1987). Therefore, a full 
preparation and organized plan for designing an outsourcing project is 
important. Our framework provides a comprehensive discussion on how to 
outsource properly with the risk analysis. It suggests that the outsourcing costs 
include not only the purchased price but also the transaction costs or other 
extra costs that may incur due to the certain risks and uncertainty (e.g. 
inter-dependence of jobs). Since our framework has already identified the 
possible risks that would influence outsourcing costs, our next research 
problem is to examine a quantitative model that will quantify and estimate the 
loss due to those possible risks that may be arisen from disruption of service, 
vendors' underperformance or mis-coordination among the IS functions. 
Therefore, based on the factors that we discussed in the framework, we will 
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introduce a quantitative model for an outsourcing decision with the evaluation 
of all the possible costs associated including the inter-dependence among the 
jobs in Chapter 4. Since each IS function may be interrelated, the performance 
on one job may affect the performance on another. Our mathematical model 
would find an optimal solution to what extent the firm should outsource with 
the consideration of the coordination cost that may exist due to the 
inter-dependence among the insourcing and outsourcing jobs. In fact, the 
decision-making model will help us to identify which jobs should be 
outsourced with the lowest cost and less effect on others. 
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Chapter 4 
Single Vendor Approach 
In fact, most literature only clarified the options, costs and implications which 
are too conceptual or narrow to make decisions. Some of which used the 
mathematical models only to evaluate the outsourcing options such as vendor 
selections but not decisions. Surprisingly, only few articles evaluated this 
complicated decision using a quantitative approach. As mentioned in Chapter 
2，the existing decision model may still be insufficient and ineffective for 
outsourcing process. They may fail in identifying the possible risk and 
uncertainty and underestimate the governing, coordination and hidden costs 
that may arise during outsourcing. As a matter of fact, a competent and 
effective decision strategy should go through risk analysis and evaluate the 
risk that would possibly affect the outsourcing ventures. 
Most research models including Patterson and Rolland's [2002] ^  treated 
every outsourcing decision as an independent event and ignored the 
importance of the inter-relationship among the IS functions which could 
tremendously influence the coordination of the outsourcing activities. Gulati 
[1995] and Masten [1984] agreed that this "independent" treatment was not 
appropriate. Our framework also shows that coordination of jobs is important 
in outsourcing aspects. 
2 The description of this paper is written in Chapter 2. To the best of our knowledge, this is 
the only decision model to solve the outsourcing problem using linear programming. 
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Therefore, based on our framework that we discussed in Chapter 3，we 
propose a decision model to evaluate the outsourcing decisions and determine 
the assignment of jobs with the risk considerations by applying some of the 
crucial factors suggested. Indeed, our outsourcing decision model would 
consider various factors that may implicitly or explicitly influence the 
outsourcing costs. We assume that cost efficiency is the most critical factor in 
evaluating outsourcing decision and our goal is to achieve the IS functions 
with the minimum outsourcing or insourcing costs. 
Compared with the existing models, our model is unique in many ways. It 
takes not only cost-effectiveness as the main objective but also considers the 
inter-related nature of tasks. Since each IS function may be interrelated, the 
performance on one job may affect the performance on another. Also, our 
model incorporates the performance of a vendor which estimates the extra 
manufacturing cost it may incur. As a matter of fact, our quantitative model 
would find an optimal solution to the assignment of jobs with the 
consideration of the insourcing cost, outsourcing cost, the extra manufacturing 
cost due to performance of the vendor and the coordination cost that may exist 
due to the inter-dependence among the insourcing and outsourcing jobs. The 
problem definition and the formulation are presented in the next section. A 
mixed integer programming model is formulated in section 4.2 for the single 
vendor approach. In section 4.3，a numerical example are presented and 
solved with the Excel Solver based on our formulation. Managerial 
implications are derived from the computational experience of our model and 
are discussed in section 4.4. Lastly, the extension to the multiple vendor 
approach will be discussed in section 4.5. 
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4.1 Modeling Considerations 
Before making an outsourcing decision, we have to analyze all the factors that 
may explicitly or implicitly influence the outsourcing cost. In fact, an 
effective outsourcing should help the firm save the short term as well as the 
long term costs. However, managers often only concern the standard cost for 
material, labor and overhead against the quoted purchased price from vendors 
which may not be sufficient for decision-making process (Tayles and Dniry 
[2001]). 
For instance, managers should consider all the transaction costs and 
manufacturing costs that may involve if the single vendor is under 
performance. Failure in estimating this extra manufacturing cost might lead to 
loss in profit. In fact, vendor may undergo opportunistic behavior; thus this 
would increase the governing cost in outsourcing event. If the outsourcing 
service is hard to be replaced by other vendors in an uncompetitive market, 
there would exist a risk of 'contract breach externalities' or the contractee 
would have the potential to shirk (Vining and Globerman [1999]). 
Another important issue in making outsourcing decisions is the 
inter-dependence and coordination among the jobs. Since each IS function 
may be interrelated, the performance on one job may affect the performance 
on another due to their coordination and reliance. Therefore, the decision for 
outsourcing would not only include all the possible costs associated but also 
the inter-dependence and coordination among the jobs. In fact, an effective 
outsourcing should minimize all the relevant cost. In our decision model, we 
would figure out to what extent the firm should outsource under certain risk 
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and opportunities with the evaluation of all the cost that may exist including 
the inter-dependence among the insourcing and outsourcing jobs. A numerical 
example will be presented in evaluating the outsourcing decision in section 
4.3. 
In the literature, many researchers have proposed different strategies towards 
outsourcing decisions and determine the possible outsourcing options. 
However, these models are rather conceptual and treat each IS jobs 
individually. They are mostly qualitative and not sufficient for a user to make 
an outsourcing decision. In fact, outsourcing decisions should be evaluated 
systematically and consist of all fixed costs and extra governing costs and all 
the associated cost due to the inter-dependence among the jobs. 
Therefore, our mathematical model is based on the costs including fixed costs 
for both insourcing and outsourcing jobs, the extra manufacturing costs such 
as bargaining cost and opportunism cost of the vendors that may generate due 
to the performance levels and the associated costs due to the interrelationship 
of the activities. 
4.1.1 Fixed cost for insourcing and outsourcing jobs 
The fixed cost for the insourcing jobs includes all the set up cost for 
establishing a service such as the permanent personnel and technology cost 
and control cost. It also includes the coordination cost and monitoring cost for 
internal operation. However, the total requirement for the in-house production 
regarding to labor resources, computer facilities and expertise cannot exceed 
the maximum capacity of the firm. The fixed cost for the outsourcing jobs is 
36 
simply the purchased price which is the set-up cost for performing the work 
including establishing a relationship with the outsourcer and any contracting 
costs to handle the process. Nevertheless, this quoted purchased price does not 
necessarily reflect the actual cost to the outsourcer and does not include any 
extra manufacturing cost that may be required for governing the transaction. 
4.1.2 Expected extra manufacturing costs 
The extra or additional manufacturing costs are the transaction costs such as 
bargaining costs and opportunism costs arisen in governing outsourcing 
activities. Bargaining cost can arise from negotiation and monitoring which 
can happen in pre- or post-contractual stage. Opportunism refers to a vendor 
who would change the agreed terms of the contract to be more in its 
self-interest. Vendor may negotiate changes in the contract and demand a 
higher price than the market price. In fact, opportunism often happens in 
outsourcing contexts due to the distribution of profits (Vining and Globerman, 
1999). These extra governing costs appear when the vendors cannot achieve 
the expected level of performance and can be estimated by the outsourcers 
according to the vendor selection criteria. 
4.1.2.1 Vendor Performance Matrix 
The expected extra manufacturing costs can be pre-estimated by the 
outsourcer using the vendor performance matrix. The methodology used is 
similar to that suggested in Soukup [1987]. The matrix is designated to 
analyze the individual vendor's performance under an estimation of extra 
manufacturing cost that may be generated in various operating conditions. We 
assume that the price is the most dominant factor in outsourcing acts. The 
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performance of the potential vendor is extremely important towards the IS 
functions and failure in achieving the expected level of performance would 
lead to an extra governing cost. 
Since vendor selection process is very critical in making the outsourcing 
decisions, various criteria must be considered in order to find the best suitable 
vendor to accomplish the task. Dickson (1966) have studied 23 vendor 
selection criteria which still identify the importance in selection process and is 
a valid benchmark. Weber et al. (1991) have conducted a survey and found 
that these criteria are still used to measure and evaluate the vendor's capability 
and ability to complete the assignment. The top ten selection criteria are 
quality, delivery, performance history, warranties and claim policies, 
production facilities and capacity, price, technical capacity, financial position, 
procedural compliance and communication system (Dickson 1966). 
In our vendor performance matrix, the vendor selection committee will weight 
the vendor's performance based on these criteria in order to give a more 
completed view in analyzing and measuring the vendors' efficiency. Indeed, 
these criteria can act as the indicators to predict how the vendor may perform. 
The committee will judge if the vendor would be able to fulfill the 
requirement of the contract and meet the expectations since they may be 
varied in abilities of achieving the task. In fact, the vendor will be "scored" on 
how well they would perform based on the criteria. To execute the 
performance matrix, first the managers would have to estimate relative extra 
manufacturing cost that may be generated if the vendor performs well, fairly 
or poorly. Second, the managers would forecast the possibility on each of the 
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performance level and then assign the probabilities on the three conditions 
that might prevail. The expected extra manufacturing cost could then be 
computed by multiplying each performance level by the estimated cost and by 
the probability of achieving respective level. 
4.1.3 Correlation costs among the jobs 
Another term which involves in decision making for IS outsourcing is the 
coordination among the jobs. When we decide if a job should be outsourced or 
done by in-house, one may consider its reliance and importance to another job. 
One IS function (e.g. training), which may have high reliance and dependence 
on another job (e.g. system development and planning), may be risky to 
outsource and better processed by in-house due to better coordination and 
monitoring of the correlated functions. On the other hand, another IS function 
(e.g. PC maintenance), which may not be strategic and has a low dependence 
on another job (e.g. system development), could be outsourced since it has 
low correlations to other jobs and proceeds minimized risks. Therefore, when 
we decide two jobs if they should be done by in-house or outsourced, we 
would also consider the inter-dependence of the two jobs. There are only four 
possible scenarios of assigning these two jobs which are either insourced or 
outsourced. 
Scenario 1. Both job 1 and job2 are outsourced; 
Scenario 2. Job 1 is outsourced and job 2 is done by in-house; 
Scenario 3. Job 1 is done by in-house and job 2 is outsourced; 
Scenario 4. Both job 1 and job 2 are done by in-house. 
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Each combination may appear certain risk in terms of the inter-dependence 
and co-ordination of the two jobs which may raise the costs since the 
performance level of each job function may affect another. 
4.1.4 Independence of the terms 
In the model formulation, we can treat the first three terms independently but 
not the last term- the correlation cost between any two tasks. The first two 
terms -the in-house production cost and the purchasing prices for the job 
function are projected according to each job nature and offered by different 
party and are independent from each of the task. They are simply offered by 
the outsourcer and are estimated by the client according to their costs, profit 
margin and the resources available for that particular job. The third term 
-expected extra manufacturing costs are estimated according to each of the 
vendors' performance and their special skill set that may be appropriate and 
apt for the assigned task. These costs plainly depend on the capability and 
ability of the vendors on one special task but are unrelated to other job 
assignment. 
However, the last term Zy .correlation cost is arisen from the inter-related 
nature of the tasks and cannot be treated independently as it governs the 
coordination of any two jobs. The correlation cost defines the least possible 
correlation that may exist due to the coordination and interdependence nature 
of the tasks according to the given scenarios. This cost is dependent on how 
the job assignments should be given to the respective party in order to achieve 
cost effectiveness since the inappropriate job assignments may induce a very 
high coordination cost. This zy parameter finds the best matching of jobs such 
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that the correlation cost will be minimized with the consideration of all the 
possible combination of tasks (all the possible scenarios). 
4.2 Quantitative Model 
We consider if we would have A/‘ number of jobs to be either done by in house 
or outsourced. There will be either a fixed cost for the insourcing job i, q, or a 
fixed cost to the outsourcing job i, di, to conduct the event. Also there will be 
an extra manufacturing costs hi appearing during the outsourcing process due 
to the performance levels of the vendors. This expected extra cost can be 
pre-estimated by the vendor performance matrix. Besides, the model considers 
the inter-dependence of two particular jobs i and j, i^j when deciding if they 
should be outsourced by company. There are four possible scenarios in 
assigning the two jobs, denoted by A： = {1，2，3，4) and their statuses are 
described as followed. 
1. Both j ob i and job j are outsourced; 
2. Job i is outsourced and job j is in-house produced; 
3. Job i is in-house produced and job j outsourced; 
4. Both job i and job j are in-house produced. 
let r^ k E K be the associated cost due to their inter-dependence on the 
performance of job i and job j, which are assigned in scenario k. It also 
determines the coordination cost to achieve an identical standard level of 
performance under different scenarios. 
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We assume the jobs can only be done by in-house or outsourced. The 
followings are the definitions for other notations on this problem. 
N= number of jobs to be performed; 
K= {1, 2, 3, 4} be the possible scenario in assigning the two job i and j to 
be outsourced or done by in-house; 
M = number of types of resources in the company; 
Ci = the fixed cost for the insourcing job i\ 
di= the fixed cost for the outsourcing job i; 
hi = the extra manufacturing cost to outsourcers when the vendor performs 
job z; 
ry — the associated cost due to the inter-dependence of job i and job j under 
the scenario k; 
Qm = the maximum resource m available in the company; 
dim = the amount of resource m required by job i when the job is done by 
in-house; 
Xi= 1 if job i is done by in-house, and 0 if job i is outsourced; 
Zij = the resultant associated cost due to the specific assignment of job i and 
j\ 
A mixed integer programming (MIP) is formulated as followed to determine 
the assignment of all Njobs (either outsourcing or done by in-house) such that 
all the possible explicit and implicit cost are minimized. 
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N N N N N 
Minimize [c,.^,. + [ d . ( 1 -jc,) + [ h . + u^ 
»=1 i=l M /=1 J>i 
subject to 
i X x , � & form = l，2，...,M (1) j=i 
z" > r j [ l - J：, - X j for i<j\ ij= 1,2, (2) 
z.. >ry[xj -X,.] _<j,i’j=l,2,…’ N (3) 
z.. >ry[xi-Xj] for i<j\iJ= 1,2, ...,N (4) 
Zy > r.j [x. + Xj -ij for i<j, ij= 1, 2, TV (5) 
A：, e {0,1} f o r / = l , 2 , (6) 
The objective of the formulation is to minimize the total cost of assigning N 
jobs which may have some dependence on each other. Constraints (1) are 
capacity constraint of each resource such that the total resources of the 
in-house production will not exceed the resource available in the company. 
Constraints set (2) to (5) determine the lowest bound of the associated cost 
due to inter-dependence when job i and job j are assigned to a specific 
scenario. Note that only one of the constraints (2) to (5) is valid. For example, 
if job i is outsourced and job j is produced in-house, Xi = 0 and xj = 1 and 
hence only constraints (3) are valid with z.j > r^ . For any other constraints 
on Zip the right-hand-side are all zero or negative under this particular 
combination of x/ and xj. Constraints (6) are the integer requirement of the 
jobs such that each job is either outsourced or done by in-house. 
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4.3 Numerical Example 
This example illustrates the decision model on a single vendor case. The 
model is formulated as a mixed integer programming and the solution 
methodology based on Solver is used. Indeed, the mathematical model only 
requires modest computational effort which is easy to integrate in Excel. The 
worksheet for this example can be obtained in Appendix B. 
A company is deciding the assignment of five IS related functions - system 
development, training, maintenance, telecommunication and system 
integration if they should outsource or insource. Table 4.1 shows the 
insourcing and outsourcing cost. The company may think of outsourcing all 
the five jobs due to cost reduction. However, the consideration on the 
production cost is not sufficient since it does not necessarily reflect the actual 
cost of doing the business. 
Cost in Million |l |2 |3 、！4 ^ [s �� 
In-house 10 9.9 1 “-秦 3.2 ^^  6.8；；：^, 
Outsource 5.5 9.6 0.9 … 3 >：> 6.5 
Table 4.1. The production costs for insourcing and outsourcing jobs 低 
Therefore, our decision model also considers the hidden cost that may arise 
when governing the activities such as the expected extra manufacturing cost 
and the associated cost due to the inter-dependence among the jobs. The 
expected extra cost is pre-estimated by the outsourcer according to vendor 
selection criteria. To execute the performance matrix, first the managers 
would have to estimate relative extra manufacturing cost that may be 
generated if the vendor performs well, fairly or poorly. Second, the managers 
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would forecast the possibility on each of the performance level and then 
assign the probabilities on the three conditions that might prevail. The 
expected extra manufacturing cost could then be computed by multiplying 
each performance level with the estimated cost and the probability of 
achieving respective level. According to table 4.2，the resultant expected extra 
cost is 0.24 Million for the particular vendor to perform job 1. Table 4.3 




Performance Cost in Mil Probability 
GOOD 0.01 0£5 0.0025 
FAIR 0.1375 
POOR (U (U  
Resultant expected extra cost 0.24 
Table 4.2. Expected extra costs for the single vendor to perform job 1 
Vendors 1 2 3 4 5 
Expected extra cost 0.24 0.319 0.04 0.164 0.124 
Table 4.3. Expected extra costs for the single vendor to perforin the five jobs 
In addition to the expected extra manufacturing cost that may exist due to the 
performance level, the decision model also considers the associated cost due 
to the inter-dependence among the jobs. For example on the second scenario, 
if we have job i outsourced and job j done by in-house. Table 4.4 shows the 
associated cost that may result due to specific combination of jobs. According 
to table 4，if we have job 2 outsourced and job 1 done by in-house, there will 
persist a cost of 0.2 million for the co-ordination of the two jobs. 
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Associated cost Outsource 、々气 
�n-house — 1 b b , ^ [ 4 � — �丨 5 
1 0 0.2 02 ： 0,3 ’年气 < 0.1、、 
2 ~ 等 : . 0 . 3 
3 0.2 0.1 0 0.12 ^  
4 0.4 0.3 0.2 V 多 \ 
5 ~ Q . 3 0.2 . 0 . 2 5 � X " " 0 . 4 � ! ’ ‘ | o r : g 丄 
Table 4.4. The associated costs due to interdependence of jobs when job i outsourced and 
job j done by in-house (Scenario 2) . 
The decision model is constrained with the limited resources of the firm and 
lowest bound of the associated costs due to the inter-dependence of the jobs 
according to the assigned scenarios. Table 4.5 shows the resources required 
for each jobs. For example, job 1 consumes labor cost of 100 million, 
hardware cost of 50 millions and expertise cost of 20 million for performing 
the job. However, the company cannot perform all the tasks as they have 
limited resources which cost 200 millions on labors, 100 millions on the 
hardware and 50 millions for experts. Therefore, the resources required for all 
the insourcing jobs have to be less or equal to the maximum resources of the 
firm due to the limited budget. Also, the other four Constraints (2)-(5) 
determine the lowest bond of the associated cost due to the interdependence of 
the jobs. Only one of the four constraints is valid and satisfied with the 
specific combination of the two jobs. We assumed that they are all 
non-negative constraints. 
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Resources ® � Max resources ol 
1 2 3 5 ；“ required in Mil the firm 
Labor cost 100 150 50 150 180 200 ^ 
Hardware cost 50 30 20 30 40 100 . 
、、.•：. • • . 
Expertise cost 20 ^ 10 30 20 50 ， 
Table 4.5. The constraints- resources required by each job and max resources of the firm 
Our decision variable ；c is deciding whether the job is insourced {1} or 
outsourced {0}. The decision variables Zy determine the resulted associated 
cost under particular assignment of jobs i and j according to the four 
scenarios. 
By running the model using the Excel Solver, we found that the optimal 
solution in minimizing the total cost of assigning the five jobs which is shown 
as table 4.6. We found that the firm better have job 1, 4 and 5 outsourced and 
job 2 and 3 done by in-house. And the total cost will become 28.668 millions 
according to our model. 
JOBS : |l |2 丨 陣 M l ^ g j 編 I f 
國 
Tahle 4.6. The optimal solution to the d^ision rapdel; M ^ f ^ \*l • 
(insourced {!); outsource^ {0}) - ，:〈、、‘ , 嚴 疾 兹 雲 
This model only shows a single vendor approach. However, in practice, we 
usually deal with multiple vendor approach where we have several vendors to 
choose from. We will integrate the vendor selection process into our model in 
Chapter 5. 
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4.4 Managerial Implications 
4.4.1 The importance of the co-relation parameter 
Our formulation based on the mixed integer programming determines the 
assignment of jobs with the cost analysis. The methodology would be also 
useful to evaluate the importance of the IS functions towards the company. We 
assume that the cost for the in-house production would be the same as the 
outsourcing cost together with the expected extra manufacturing cost. Let 
be our total outsourcing cost, and 
c,. = e,. 
where e. = J . + h^  
The formulation becomes 
N N N N 
Minimize ^ c . x . + J]劝-咖 S S 
/=1 i=l /=1 j>i 
When we have insourcing cost equal to the total outsourcing cost, the 
outsourcing decision will rely on the critical parameter Zy -co-relation of jobs. 
This factor governs the coordination between the two particular jobs in terms 
of their inter-dependence. It determines which combination of jobs would 
persist the least cost and effect according to the four possible situations which 
is described in section 4.1.3. Indeed, this parameter shows which jobs are 
strategic to the company and possess a great effect or competency to the 
company; and therefore, we would better have these jobs done by in-house. 
4.4.2 Penalty Scheme 
On the other hand, when c. > e.，the model may suggest that the company 
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could outsource all IS functions since they are lower in costs. The company 
will then suffer from not having any in-house production and waste their 
resource. To fully utilize the resources for the in-house production, we assume 
that the company would need to pay for the penalty for their unused resources. 
The formulation is revised with the additional penalty of the unused resources. 
Constraints (1) would also be revised since they only show that total resources 
for the in-house production can not exceed the resources available in the 
company but not indicate whether the company has filled up with their 
resource. We assume that the company will be fined at bm per unit for the 
unused resource m and ym is the unused resource m. 
The formulation becomes 
N N N N M 
Minimize X + Z " ) + Z Z 
(=1 J=1 /=1 j>i m=\ 
Constraints (1) will become 
N 
T.^imXi+ym =Qn, forW=l，2，...，M (1’) 
M 
To minimize the penalty, the model would suggest the company to have more 
in-house production such that the in-house resources would be fully utilized. 
Resolving our problem with the revised formulation and constraints, the 
optimal solution for the assignment of jobs is shown in table 4.7. The 
resources used for the in-house production is shown in table 4.8.The total cost 
will become $37.543 million where it would be $38.168 million with the prior 
assignment of jobs (with the consideration of penalty). 
49 
^ s |1 |2 _ 隱 服 麵 
Table 4.7. The optimal solution to the revised dedsroAodel ； T 
(insource- {!}； outsource^{0}) : t M ^ ^ ^ ^ S . 
„ , ^ . . , n With the Max resources of the Resources used Poor assignment of _ • s consideration of the fjnn In Mil jobs , penalty  
Labor cost 200 ^ “ 200 
Hardware cost 50 ^ ’ 100， 
Expertise cost 35 40 50 法.. 
Table 4.8. The used resources for the in-house production 
4.4.3 Price Changes 
Having resolved the revised model with the consideration of penalty, the 
assignment of jobs changes accordingly. Now, we will investigate the 
difference in the job assignments using the original model with the revised 
one by different pricing. Some interesting patterns on the assignments of jobs 
can be discovered if the purchasing prices fluctuate dramatically. 
When the vendor discounted their purchasing price of the jobs to 50 % of the 
in-house cost which is shown in table 4.9，the market is not competitive than 
before. The recommended job assignments from the two models are presented 
in table 4.10. 
Jobs I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 
Insourcing costs 10 9.9 1 3.2 6.8 
Purchasing price 5 4.5 0.5 1.6 3.4 
Table 4.9. The pricing of IS functions (if the purchasing price 
dropped to 50% of in-house costs) 
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Job Assignment 1 2 3 4 5 
In-house (NO penalty) 0 0 0 0 0 _ 
In-house (penalty) 0 0 1 1 0 
Table 4.10. The job assignments from the original and revised 
models ({1 }=insource; {0}=outsourced) 
If the vendor dropped their purchasing price to 50% of the in-house cost, the 
model would suggest the user to have all the jobs outsourced even though 
there exist the expected extra manufacturing cost and higher correlation cost 
for the outsourcing jobs. The total outsourcing cost becomes $18.737M. 
Obviously, there will be much savings in having all the jobs outsourced as the 
vendor offers an "unreasonably" low price, which dampens the competition. 
The company may be benefit from short-turn savings; however, the company 
may experience a higher long-run cost if the vendor imder-perform. Since all 
the jobs functions are outsourced which may be strategic to the company, the 
vendor could threaten to withdraw the services and this could shut down the 
firm. The company should eliminate this problem by producing some of the 
strategic function themselves (Vining and Globerman). Moreover, all the 
in-house resources will be wasted if we have all the jobs outsourced. 
To fully utilized their resources and avoid opportunism, the revised model 
recommends the outsourcer to have job 3 and job 4 done by in-house. The 
revised model could identify which jobs are strategic or important to the 
company under the penalty scheme. The total cost becomes $28.843M, which 
is $83,947 with previous assignment on the revised model. The difference is 
significant since the penalty plays an important role in the cost consideration 
for the decision making process. Therefore, the penalty would be dominant in 
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the outsourcing cost and judge if the decision is favorable to the user in this 
special situation. 
On the other hand, we would also determine the job assignment when the 
vendor rose their purchasing price up to 150% of the in-house cost which is 
shown in table 4.11. As there is a limited resource of the in-house production, 
the outsourcer does not have the capability to have all the jobs done by 
in-house and have to outsource some of the functions even they are high in 
price. An interesting pattern on the job assignment can be seen in table 4.12. 
Jobs I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 
Insourcing costs 10 9.9 1 3.2 6.8 
Purchasing price 15 15 1.5 4.8 12.2 
Table 4.11. The pricing for IS functions (if the purchasing price 
raises up to 150% of the in-house costs) 
Job Assignment 1 2 3 4 5 
In-house (NO penalty) 0 _ 1 1 0 0 
In-house (penalty) 0 1 1 0 0 
Table 4.12. The job assignment from the original and revised 
models ({l}=insouice; {0}=outsourced) 
If the purchasing price raises up to 150% of the insourcing cost, both the 
original model and the revised model with the consideration of penalty 
suggest the firm to have job 2 and job 3 done by in-house. The total 
outsourcing cost will be $45.668M whereas $55,168 with the consideration of 
penalty. Since the in-house resources have already been maximized by 
producing the two jobs, the firm could not hold any more in-house production 
and is forced to outsource the other three jobs. Moreover, the penalty does not 
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affect the outsourcing decision since the in-house production has already fully 
utilized. In this situation, penalty is negligible in the cost consideration as the 
rise in the purchasing price is too high. 
Indeed, this is an alert for the outsourcer if the vendor has the potential to 
shirk or be opportunistic. Shirking refers to a vendor who may 
under-performed on the contracted activities (Ngwenyama and Bryson, 1999). 
Opportunism refers to a vendor who would change the agreed terms of the 
contract to be more in its self-interest. Vendor may negotiate changes in the 
contract and demand a higher price than the market price. In fact, 
opportunism often happens in outsourcing contexts due to the distribution of 
profits (Vining and Globerman, 1999). 
In the single vendor approach, the outsourcer will be "locked" into one vendor 
since the market is not competitive. Only few firms are available to provide 
the same service which incurs a high switching cost if the contractee performs 
unsatisfactory. As mentioned in Chapter 2，the degree of contestability would 
affect opportunism costs. To minimize the risk of opportunism, a heavy 
investment in governing and monitoring mechanism is required to safeguard 
the transactions. Or, the outsourcer should enhance the competition by owning 
the fixed assets and leasing them to the vendors. More new potential vendors 
would be attracted to the business since they do not have to make the large 
sunk-cost investments (Vining and Globerman, 1999). On the other hand, in 
multiple vendor approach, the outsourcers have more vendors to choose from 
and a greater bargaining power to lower the purchasing price and hence 
achieve the higher level of performance. Also, multiple vendors enhance a 
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higher operational flexibility since different vendors have different specialties 
in their technical services. We will investigate the multiple vendor approach in 
Chapter 5. 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
Outsourcing has been widely studied over the past decades; however, there is 
no unique way to define IS outsourcing. After reviewing the literature, 
surprisingly, there were few articles that evaluated the outsourcing decision 
using mathematical approaches. Therefore, our first research problem is to 
evaluate the decision using the Mixed Integer Programming and the objective 
is to minimize all the possible insourcing and outsourcing costs with the 
consideration of the inter-dependence among the jobs. The model gives out an 
optimal solution to the assignment of five IS related jobs which not only 
considers the production cost but also the governing costs such as expected 
extra manufacturing cost due to the performance level of jobs and the 
associated cost due to the inter-dependence of jobs. Managerial Concerns are 
also presented. As the purchasing prices change dramatically, the model reacts 
passively due to the in-competitive environment. The model is then resolved 
under the penalty scheme such that it can identify which jobs functions are 
more strategic and better insourced. 
Moreover, the managerial implications show that single vendor approach 
seems to be insufficient and inefficient in managing the outsourcing activities. 
We will integrate the multi-vendor situation into our model in Chapter 5 in 
order to improve the efficiency of the decision model. In multi-vendors 
approach, outsourcers may have more options on choosing an appropriate 
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vendor; indeed, each vendor may have different capability and ability to 
perform the contracted jobs. Therefore, companies would obtain different 




Multiple Vendor Approach 
Similar to single vendor approach, the model will consider the factors that 
may explicitly or implicitly influence the outsourcing cost. Other than the 
in-house production cost or the purchasing price for the job functions, the 
model has to estimate the extra manufacturing cost for each vendor according 
to the vendor selection criteria. Since the model is extended to the multiple 
vendor approach, vendor's performance could be very critical to the selection 
process. If the vendors have the possibility to be opportunistic, the extra 
manufacturing cost could be dominant in the outsourcing decision. 
The inter-dependence and coordination of any two jobs are also critical 
towards the model due to the management and monitoring of the correlated 
functions. Since each IS function may be interrelated, the performance on one 
job may affect the performance on another due to their coordination and 
reliance. This factor can be very significant in the multiple vendor approach 
since different vendor would have different capabilities and performance 
levels. Also, an inappropriate combination of assigning the two jobs can 
induce a very high coordination cost. 
The same goal as of the single vendor approach, the outsourcing decision 
considers all the possible costs associated including the inter-dependence and 
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coordination among the jobs in multiple vendor approach. Now we can even 
have more vendors to choose from which give us more flexibility. Therefore, 
the model will take more serious consideration in the vendor selection process 
since the co-relation of job assignments becomes complicated in multiple 
vendor approach. In our decision model, we would figure out to what extent 
the firm should outsource to an appropriate vendor under certain risk and 
opportunities with the evaluation of all the cost that may exist including the 
inter-dependence among the insourcing and outsourcing jobs. The model 
formulation using the Mixed Integer Programming will be discussed in 
section 5.2. A numerical example in evaluating the outsourcing decision using 
multiple vendor approach will be presented in section 5.3. Managerial 
implications are derived from the computational experience of our model and 
are discussed in section 5.4. Lastly, the extension to the multiple vendor 
approach will be presented in section 5.5. 
5.1 Modeling Considerations 
Our mathematical model is based on the costs including fixed costs for both 
insourcing and outsourcing jobs, the extra manufacturing costs such as 
bargaining cost and opportunism cost of the vendors that may generate due to 
the vendor selection criteria and the associated costs due to the 
interrelationship of the activities regarding to the assignment of jobs. 
5.1.1 The Fixed Cost for insourcing and outsourcing jobs 
The fixed cost for the insourcing jobs includes all the set up cost for 
establishing a service such as the permanent personnel and technology cost 
and control cost. It also includes the coordination cost and monitoring cost for 
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internal operation. However, the total requirement for the in-house production 
regarding to labor resources, computer facilities and expertise cannot exceed 
the maximum capacity of the firm. The fixed cost for the outsourcing jobs is 
simply the purchased price which is the set-up cost for performing the work 
including establishing a relationship with the outsourcer and any contracting 
costs to handle the process. Nevertheless, this quoted purchased price does not 
necessarily reflect the actual cost to the outsourcer and does not include any 
extra manufacturing cost that may be required for governing the transaction. 
5.1.2 The expected extra manufacturing costs 
The extra or additional manufacturing costs are the transaction costs such as 
bargaining costs and opportunism costs arisen in governing outsourcing 
activities. Bargaining cost can arise from negotiation and monitoring which 
can happen in pre- or post-contractual stage. Opportunism refers to a vendor 
who would change the agreed terms of the contract to be more in its 
self-interest. Vendor may negotiate changes in the contract and demand a 
higher price than the market price. In fact, opportunism often happens in 
outsourcing contexts due to the distribution of profits (Vining and Globerman, 
1999). These extra governing costs appear when the vendors cannot achieve 
the expected level of performance and can be estimated by the outsourcers 
according the performance history of the vendors. 
5.1.2.1 Vendor Performance Matrix 
The expected extra manufacturing costs can be pre-estimated by the 
outsourcer using the vendor performance matrix. The methodology used is 
similar to that suggested in Soukup (1987). The matrix is designated to 
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analyze the individual vendor's performance under an estimation of extra 
manufacturing cost that may generate in various operating conditions. We 
assume that the cost is the most dominant factor in outsourcing acts. The 
performance of the potential vendor is extremely important towards the IS 
functions and failure in achieving the expected level of performance would 
lead to an extra governing cost. Bender et al. (1985) also agreed that the most 
critical factor in selecting vendors is the cost of vendor quality. 
Since vendor selection process is very critical in making the outsourcing 
decisions, various criteria must be considered in order to find the best suitable 
vendor to accomplish the task. Dickson (1966) have studied 23 vendor 
selection criteria which still identify the importance in selection process and is 
a valid benchmark. Weber et al. (1991) have conducted a survey and found 
that these criteria are still used to measure and evaluate the vendor's capability 
and ability to complete the assignment. The top ten selection criteria are 
quality, delivery, performance history, warranties and claim policies, 
production facilities and capacity, price, technical capacity, financial position, 
procedural compliance and communication system (Dickson 1966). 
In our vendor performance matrix，the vendor selection committee will weight 
the vendor's performance based on these criteria in order to give a more 
completed view in analyzing and measuring the vendors' efficiency. Indeed, 
these criteria can act as the indicators to predict how the vendor may perform. 
The committee will judge if the vendors would be able to fulfill the 
requirement of the contract and meet the expectations since they may be 
varied in abilities of achieving the task. In fact, the vendors will be "scored" 
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on how well they would perform based on the criteria. To execute the 
performance matrix, first the managers would have to estimate relative extra 
manufacturing cost that may be generated if the vendor performs well, fairly 
or poorly. Second, the managers would forecast the possibility on each of the 
performance level and then assign the probabilities on the three conditions 
that might prevail. The expected extra manufacturing cost could then be 
computed by multiplying each performance level by the estimated cost and by 
the probability of achieving respective level. In multiple vendor approach, all 
the vendors will be evaluated under the three possible operating conditions by 
the vendor selection committee and a numerical example shows how their 
expected extra manufacturing costs were computed in section 5.3. 
5.1.3 The Correlation costs among the jobs 
Another term which involves in decision making for IS outsourcing is the 
coordination among the jobs. When we decide if a job should be outsourced or 
done by in-house, one may consider its reliance and importance to another job. 
One IS function (e.g. training), which may have high reliance and dependence 
on another job (e.g. system development and planning), may be risky to 
outsource and better processed by in-house due to better coordination and 
monitoring of the correlated functions. On the other hand, another IS function 
(e.g. PC maintenance), which may not be strategic and has a low dependence 
on another job (e.g. system development), could be outsourced since it has 
low correlations to other jobs and proceeds minimized risks. Also, the 
coordination cost could be very different if the two jobs are outsourced to the 
same vendor or different vendors. Therefore, when we decide two jobs if they 
should be done by in-house or outsourced, we would also consider the 
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inter-dependence of the two jobs. There are only five possible scenarios of 
assigning these two jobs. 
Scenario 1. Both job 1 and job 2 are outsourced to same vendor; 
Scenario 2. Job 1 is outsourced and job 2 is done by in-house ； 
Scenario 3. Job 1 is done by in-house and job 2 is outsourced; 
Scenario 4. Both job 1 and job 2 are done by in-house; 
Scenario 5. Both job 1 and job 2 are outsourced to different vendors. 
Each combination may appear certain risk in terms of the inter-dependence 
and co-ordination of the two jobs which may raise the costs since the 
performance level of each job function may affect another and different 
vendor may persist different capabilities to perform the tasks. 
5.1.4 Independence of the terms 
In the model formulation, we can treat the first three terms independently but 
not the last term- the correlation cost between any two tasks. The first two 
terms -the in-house production cost and the purchasing prices for the job 
function are projected according to each job nature and offered by different 
party and are independent from each of the task. They are simply offered by 
the outsourcer and are estimated by the client according to their costs, profit 
margin and the resources available for that particular job. The third term 
-expected extra manufacturing costs are estimated according to each of the 
vendors' performance and their special skill set that may be appropriate and 
apt for the assigned task. These costs plainly depend on the capability and 
ability of the vendors on one special task but are unrelated to other job 
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assignment. 
However, the last term zy .correlation cost is arisen from the inter-related 
nature of the tasks and cannot be treated independently as it governs the 
coordination of any two jobs. The correlation cost defines the least possible 
correlation that may exist due to the coordination and interdependence nature 
of the tasks according to the given scenarios. This cost is dependent on how 
the job assignments should be given to the respective party in order to achieve 
cost effectiveness since the inappropriate job assignments may induce a very 
high coordination cost. This z,y parameter finds the best matching of jobs such 
that the correlation cost will be minimized with the consideration of all the 
possible combination of tasks (all the possible scenarios). 
5.2 Quantitative Model 
We consider if we would have N number of jobs to be either done by in house 
or outsourced to a vendor k. There will be either a fixed cost for the insourcing 
job i, Ci，or a fixed cost to the outsourcing job i when it is assigned to vendor k, 
dik, to conduct the event. An extra manufacturing cost hik appears when vendor 
k is performing job i. This expected extra cost estimates if vendor k has the 
ability to perform job i at the expected level and can be evaluated by the 
vendor performance matrix from the vendor selection committee. Besides, the 
model considers the inter-dependence of two particular jobs i and j, i^j when 
deciding if they should be outsourced by company. There are five possible 
scenarios in assigning the two jobs, denoted by = {1, 2，3，4，5} and their 
statuses are described as followed. 
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1. Both job i and job j are outsourced to the same vendor k; 
2. Job i is outsourced to a vendor k and job j is in-house produced; 
3. Job i is in-house produced and job j outsourced to a vendor k\ 
4. Both job i and job j are in-house produced; 
5. Both job i and job j are outsourced but to different vendors. 
Let ry s ^ S be the associated cost due to their inter-dependence on the 
performance of job i and job j, which are assigned in scenario s. It also 
determines the coordination cost to achieve an identical standard level of 
performance under different scenarios. 
We assume the jobs can only be done by in-house or outsourced. The 
followings are the definitions for other notations on this problem. 
N = number of jobs to be performed; 
S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} be the possible scenario in assigning the two job i and j 
to be outsourced or done by in-house; 
M = number of types of resources in the company; 
Ci = the fixed cost for the insourcing job i; 
dik= the fixed cost for the outsourcing job i when it is assigned to vendor k 
fOT k 邦； 
hik= the extra manufacturing cost to outsourcers when the vendor k (for k字 
0) performs job i\ 
r.j = the associated cost due to the inter-dependence of job i and job j under 
the scenario s\ 
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Qm = the maximum resource m available in the company; 
dim = the amount of resource m required by job i; 
Decision variables: 
Xik = 1 if job i is assigned to k, h= 0:K where k=0 for in-house production; 
kF=l, 2,…，K for vendor k; 
Xik =0 if job i is not assigned to k; 
Zij = the resultant associated cost due to the specific assignment of job i and 
y; 
A mixed integer programming (MIP) is formulated as followed to determine 
the assignment of all TV jobs (either outsourcing or done by in-house) such that 
all the possible explicit and implicit cost are minimized. 
N N K N K N N 
Minimize c^^ x山 + E Z 心〜 + Z Z V / * + Z I X ‘ 
/=1 (=1 jt=l /=1 k=l 1=1 J>i 
subject to 
N 
T^^ imXio ^ Qm form = l，2，."，M (1) /=i 
Zij > rl - l ] for i<j\ = 1,2, ...,N 
fork= 1,2, (2) 
r A- " 
Zy > ” � - 1 fori<j,i,j=\,2, ...,N 
L _ 
foryb=0,l, (3) 
厂 Y _ 
Zij > rfj x.Q + 众-1 for i<j\ ij= 1,2, 
L _ forA:=0,l, (4) 
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Zij > r.j + X州- i j for i<j\ i j = 1 ,2 , 
f o r 众= 0’1，...，火 ( 5 ) 
Zij —Xjk -Xj^] forz,y = l , 2 , … , N � i 半f) 
for/c=0, 1, (6) 
Xik e {0,1} f o r / = 1，2，…，TV 
forA:=0,l, (7) 
j ^ x . , = 1 for/=l，2，...，A^  (8) 
k=Q 
The objective of the formulation is to minimize the total cost of assigning N 
jobs which may have some dependence on each other. Constraint (1) is 
capacity constraint of each resource such that the total resources of the 
in-house production will not exceed the resource available in the company. 
Constraints set (2) to (6) determine the lowest bound of the associated cost 
due to inter-dependence when job i and job j are assigned to a specific 
scenario s which described earlier. Note that only one of the constraints (2) to 
(6) is valid. For example, if job i is outsourced to a vendor k and job j is 
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produced in-house, = 1 and xjo = 1 and hence only constraint (3) is /fc=i 
valid with z.j > r^ . For any other constraints on zy, the right-hand-side are all 
zero or negative under this particular combination of;c,A： and xjk. Constraints (7) 
are the integer requirement of the jobs such that each job is either outsourced 
or done by in-house. Constraints (8) states that each job i will only be 
assigned to one production unit which is either in-house production or a 
vendor k. 
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5.3 Numerical Example 
This example illustrates the decision model on a multiple vendor case. The 
model is formulated as a mixed integer programming and the solution 
methodology based on Solver is used. Indeed, the mathematical model only 
requires modest computational effort which is easy to integrate in Excel. The 
worksheet for this example can be obtained in Appendix C. 
A company is deciding the assignment of five IS related functions - system 
development, training, maintenance, telecommunication and system 
integration if they should outsource or insource and now there are three 
vendors for the company to choose from. The three vendors would have 
different capabilities to perform the tasks. They would offer different 
purchasing prices and they persist different extra manufacturing costs 
according to the vendor selection criteria. Table 5.1 shows the insourcing and 
outsourcing cost. This time, the market becomes competitive since there are 
more vendors for the client to select. The company may think of outsourcing 
the jobs with the "lowest" bid due to cost reduction. However, the 
consideration on the production cost is not sufficient since it does not 
necessarily reflect the actual cost of doing the business. 
Cost in Million : |l \l 
In-house production 10 9.9 0.5 > 3.2 . 6.8 
Vendor 1 5.5 9.6 0.9 务 § 3 ^ 6.5 
Vendor 2 7 5 1 一 2.8 , 6.6,, 
Vendor 3 15 14 2 3.9 6.3总、 
-'It-Table 5.1 The production costs for insourcing and outsourcing jobs 
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Therefore, our decision model also considers the hidden cost that may arise 
when governing the activities such as the expected extra manufacturing cost 
and the associated cost due to the inter-dependence among the jobs. The 
expected extra cost is pre-estimated by the outsourcer according to vendor 
selection criteria. To execute the performance matrix, first the managers 
would have to estimate relative extra manufacturing cost that may be 
generated if the vendor performs well, fairly or poorly. Second, the managers 
would forecast the possibility on each of the performance level and then 
assign the probabilities on the three conditions that might prevail. The 
expected extra manufacturing cost could then be computed by multiplying 
each performance level with the estimated cost and the probability of 
achieving respective level. According to table 5.2，the resultant expected extra 
cost is 0.24 Million for vendor 1 to perform job 1 particularly. Table 5.3 shows 
the expected extra cost for the three different vendors in performing the five 
different jobs. 
Job 1 
Performance for Associated Cost 
vendor 1 in Mil Probability  
GOOD ^ 0.0025 
FAIR ^ 0£5 0.1375 
POOR 02 OA  
Resultant expected extra cost 0.24 
Table 5.2. Expected extra costs for vendor 1 to perform job 1 
Expected extra cost 1 2 3 4 5 
Vendor 1 0.24 0.319 0.04 0.164 0.124 
Vendor 2 0.303 0.446 0.063 0.164 0.132 
Vendor 3 ’ 0.107 0.104 0.0225 0.072 0.062 
Table 5.3. Expected extra costs for the vendors to perform the five jobs 
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In addition to the expected extra manufacturing cost that may exist due to the 
performance level, the decision model also considers the associated cost due 
to the inter-dependence among the jobs. As described in section 5.1.3，there 
are only five scenarios that would satisfy the particular assignments of the two 
jobs. For example on the second scenario, if we have job i outsourced to one 
of the three vendors and job j done by in-house. Table 5.4 shows the 
associated cost that may result due to specific combination of jobs. According 
to table 5.4，if we have job 2 outsourced and job 1 done by in-house, there will 
persist a cost of 0.2 million for the co-ordination of the two jobs. 
Associated cost Outsource to one of the vendors 乂、、‘ : 
In -house 1 2 ^^  3 、4 . 严人Si•是 
1 0 02 0.2:^二 0:3:疗、0.1 
2 ^ _ 0 . 3 暴 0.2  
3 0.2 0.1 ~ �、，O.P 0 . 1 2 : � 
4 " o . 4 0.3 0.2 / ; 0 為。0.3~S � 
5 0.3 o J \ 0.25 0 . 4 < - " � 0 鋼、 
.。 、.： . . ： ^ . '.-.  • 
Table 5.4. The associated costs due to interdependence of jobs when job i outsourced and 
job j done by in-house (Scenario 2) fe � … -
The decision model is also constrained with the limited resources of the firm 
and lowest bound of the associated costs due to the inter-dependence of the 
jobs according to the assigned scenarios. Table 5.5 shows the resources 
required for each jobs. For example, job 1 consumes labor cost of 100 million, 
hardware cost of 50 millions and expertise cost of 20 million for performing 
the job. However, the company cannot perform all the tasks as they have 
limited resources which cost 200 millions on labors, 100 millions on the 
hardware and 50 millions for experts. Therefore, the resources required for all 
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the insourcing jobs have to be less or equal to the maximum resources of the 
firm due to the limited budget. Also, the other five Constraints (2)-(6) 
determine the lowest bond of the associated cost due to the interdependence of 
the jobs. Only one of the five constraints is valid and satisfied with the 
specific combination of the two jobs. Constraints (7) and (8) showed that the 
job can only be assigned to in-house or a vendor from the selection. We 
assumed that they are all non-negative constraints. 
Resources Max resources of the 1 2 3 4 5 ..�;i:::.;... •: required in Mil firm 
Labor cost 100 1 5 0 _ ^ _ 1 8 0 200 ' 
Hardware cost 50 30 20 30 40 100 
Expertise cost 20 ^ _ ^ ^ 30 20 50 
Table 5.5. The constraints- resources required by each job and max resources of the firm ^^  
Our decision variable Xik decides whether the job is assigned to in-house or 
one of the three vendors. The decision variables zy determine the resulted 
associated cost under particular assignment of jobs i and j according to the 
five scenarios. 
By running the model using the Excel Solver, we found that the optimal 
solution in minimizing the total cost of assigning the five jobs which is shown 
as table 5.6. We found that the firm better have job 1 outsourced to vendor 1 
and job 2, 3 and 4 outsourced to vendor 2. The model also suggested that the 
firm should keep job 5 in order to stay competent. And the total cost will 
become 24.297 millions according to our model. 
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^ s ^ ”，隨隱__國 
I — n rnMWMMm 
Vendorl , : � • � 爾 國 _ 画 国 
Vendor2 7 灣 爾 P I 疆 
^^^^ 0 M懸 1誦 1豐 
Bible 5.6. The optimal solution to 伪® 秘分 
(assigned «{ ! } ; not assigned = {0» 二“二父 
5.4 Managerial Implications 
5.4.1 Penalty Scheme 
In section 4.4, we have implemented our model with the penalty scheme and 
the revised model helps the outsourcer to identify which job function is more 
strategic to the company and save the resources. Now we also resolve the 
model with the consideration of the penalty in the multiple vendor approach. 
Since our original model only suggests the company to have job 5 done by 
in-house, it would waste a lot of their resources for performing one job. To 
fully utilize the resources for the in-house production, we assume that the 
company would need to pay for the penalty for their unused resources. The 
formulation is revised with the additional penalty of the unused resources. 
Constraints (1) would also be revised since they only show that total resources 
for the in-house production can not exceed the resources available in the 
company but not indicate whether the company has filled up with their 
resource. We assume that the company will be fined at bm per unit for the 
unused resource m and ym is the unused resource m. 
The formulation becomes 
N N K N K N N M 
Minimize Y^c^x., + ^ i l X � + Z i l X h + 
/=1 /=1 k=l ;=1 Jt=l (=1 j>i m=\ 
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Constraints (1) will becomes 
N form = l，2, ."，M (1') 
/=i 
lEEs ‘ : : : 1 輕 私 鎮 隱 _ _ 
in^houseproduction 驅 爾 國 圓 
v e 一 1 , �� 
Vendor 2 L S Z ^ i ^ i S 
Table 5.7. The optimal solution to V 
penalty scheme (assigned = {!}; not assigned “ {0 } ) | ‘ 
Resources used . . , ’ ： , , Max resources of the Original model Revised model ^ In Mil •“ firm 
Labor cost 180 2 0 0 � “� 200 
Hardware cost 40 50' ^，）•�“广：100 
Expertise cost |20 |40 � �\ 、例 �� 
Table 5.8. The used resources for the in-house production ‘ 
To minimize the penalty, the model would suggest the company to have more 
in-house production such that the in-house resources would be fully utilized. 
Resolving our problem with the revised formulation and constraints, the 
optimal solution for the assignment of jobs is shown in table 5.7. The 
resources used for the in-house production is shown in table 5.8.The total cost 
will become $32.472 million where it would be $44.237 million with the prior 
assignment of jobs (with the consideration of penalty). 
5.4.2 Limited resources of the vendors 
In multiple vendor approach, the original model advises the client to 
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outsource three job functions to the vendor 2 due to cost reduction. However, 
the vendor may also have limited budget on the resources such that they could 
not hold the excessive production, the revised model will then be constrained 
with the maximum resources Qmk of the vendor k. As the amount of resources 
dint is required to perform job i. the total resources required by the job 
assignments of vendor k cannot exceed the maximum resources Qmk of itself. 
Table 5.9 presents the maximum resources for the three vendors. 
Qmk = the maximum resource m available in vendor k; 
aim = the amount of resource m required by job i. 
Constraints (9) will then be added to our model. 
N 
Y / ^ i A 吼k forw = l , 2 , . . . , M /=i 
foTk=l,2,...,K ( 9 ) 
Maximum Resources in Mil Vendor 1 Vendor 2 Vendor 3 
Labor cost 100 300 150 
Hardware cost ^ 100 60 
Expertise cost 40 50 | 40 
Table 5.9. The maximum resources for the vendors . . . 
Resourced used in , 一 ， , … r , . ,r , « , , , � Vendor 1 Vendor 2 Vendor 3 Vendor 1 Vendor 2 Vendor 3 
Mil 勞 
Labor cost 100 350 0 100 loO 150 
Hardware cost 50 80 0 50 50 30 
Expertise cost 20 65 0 20 35 30 
Revised model with the limit 
Original model capacity of the vendors 
Table 5.10. The resources used for the vendors 
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loBS , 縣 | 艦 _ _ | 4 ^ | 1 8 
In^houseproduction ： ^ ^ M M M M M 
Vendorl 、： 丁 
V e n . 2 … - ^ ^ T ' m M W M 
^ ^ ^ 十 
Dable 5.11. The revised job 场 c a p S i ^ ^ S 
vendors (assigned = {!}; not assigned = . 
The original model (table 5.6) suggests the outsourcer to outsource job 2，3 
and 4 to a particular vendor. Our original model assumes that the vendor has 
unlimited resources; however, in practice, the vendor often has the limited 
resources which cannot perform excessive job functions. The additional 
constraints (9) show capacity constraint of each vendor such that the total 
resources required by the job assignments will not exceed the resource 
available in the individual vendor. The revised solution with the limited 
capacity of the vendors (table 5.11) would then suggest the outsourcer should 
only outsource job 2 and 3 to vendor 2，job 4 to vendor 5 and job 1 to vendorl. 
And it should keep job 5 done by in-house. The resources used for each 
vendor are shown in table 5.10. The total costs become $25.605 millions. 
Although vendor 3 offered the highest purchasing price on job 4 (see table 
5.1), the revised model is forced to assign vendor 3 to perform job 4 due to the 
limited resources available in the company and the vendors. If the client has 
more vendors to choose from, this expensive job assignment could be 
avoided. 
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5.4.3 Limiting the power of the vendors 
Assuming if the vendors have expansion and increase their budget such that 
they now have enough capacity to perform all the job functions, the revised 
model will the additional constraints (9) would still suggest the client to 
outsource three of the five jobs function to vendor 2. On the other hand, some 
vendors may give discounts on the second offers so as to attract more 
customers. The model may then decide to assign more jobs to the discounted 
vendor in order to save money. Or when one of the vendors drops their 
purchasing price by 50% of the in-house production cost, the model would 
suggest the client to have all the functions outsourced to the same vendor due 
to cost reduction which is discussed in section 4.4. These outsourcing ^ 
practices would then empower the control of the particular vendor. The client 
may not just suffer from the lack of power and control over the IS activities. 
The high dependence and reliance on a particular vendor may then increase 
the risk in opportunism. 
As mentioned in the outsourcing framework in chapter 3，total outsourcing 
persists a higher risk in losing the control over the IS activities and losing the 
competence of the firms. Also, full outsourcing may lead to inadequate 
communications over the entire IS process that may create frustrations or 
confusions to both the client and the vendors. Moreover, Lacity and Willcocks 
(1998) suggested that selective outsourcing could provide more flexibility as 
well as control over the IS functions. Therefore, the assignments for each 
vendor should be limited in order to prevent the vendors from being 
over-powered. 
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One way to keep more production in-house is to implement the penalty 
scheme towards the model which has already discussed in section 5.4.1. 
Another way to force the model to assign more jobs for in-house production is 
to limit their power over the IS functions. The revised model will be 
constrained with limited assignment of jobs such that the job assignments for 
the vendors are restricted. Constraints (10) will be added towards the model 
and states that the vendors can only be assigned less than two jobs even if they 
offer the lower costs than other vendors. 
Constraints (10) becomes 
X汝 < 2 for/=1,2,. . . ,TV 
forA:=l,2, ...,K (10) 
^ S | l 卞 滅 剛 麵 ， 
In-house production 0 ‘ 0 .：痛.1 饭轉 
Vendor 1 0 運 i 圓 痛 
Vendor2 ， T " 〒 ！ 赞 爾 
'、：卜0十0偏_|難 
> . ‘ � * 喻二 I � � 
Table 5.12. The revised job assignment with the ^Uroited c p n t r ^ i ^ ^ e 
vendors (assigned = {!}; not ^ i g n e d = {0)) 
Resolving the model with the additional constraints (10)，the job assignment 
changes accordingly (see table 5.11). Compared with the original model (table 
5.6), each vendor will now be assigned for only one job but previously the 
model decided to have three jobs outsourced to vendor 2. The model also 
suggests keeping two job functions done by in house. The client will then 
have more in-house production than before which can fully utilize the 
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resources and save the money in the company. The total costs become 
$24.472millions which was 24.297millions in the original model The small 
difference in costs is due to the limitation of the job assignments of the vendor 
2 and the revised model is forced to choose another slightly expensive job 
assignment. 
Coincidently, the solution resolving with the penalty scheme which is 
discussed in section 5.4.1 (see table 5.7) is the same as the one resolving with 
the limited power of the vendors. Both revised models enable the outsourcer 
to identify the strategic functions and keep them in-house. Indeed, the model 
with the limited power of the vendors could let the client limit their job 
assignments and avoid them from being over-powered which lead to better 
control over the IS functions. 
5.4.4 Competitive market 
As mentioned in section 4.4, if the purchasing price of one vendor rises 
dramatically, the model would react passively since there are no other vendors 
to select. As discussed in the outsourcing framework in chapter 3，if there is 
only single vendor available in providing the service to the outsourcer, there is 
a potential for the vendor to shirk since there is no other competitors. On the 
other hand, multiple vendor approach would induce a competition in the 
market and the potential of opportunism is reduced. In fact, greater 
competition would enhance lower bids, better services and more satisfactory 
performance. Now, we will consider the condition that one of the vendors (i.e. 
vendor 1) rises their prices by 50 % of in-house production cost in multiple 
vendor approach. We will resolve it by both the original model and the revised 
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model constrained with limited power of the vendors. Table 5.13 shows the 
purchasing prices offered by the in-house and the vendors. 
Cost in Million |l |2 ^ ^ i P f e l 一 
In-house production 10 9.9 0.5 2>2 . 6.8 
Vendor 1 Is" 1.5 ^ 4.8 12.2 
Vendor 2 7 ^ 1 2.8 广 6.6 
Vendor 3 15 14— i. 2 / 3,9 . ；v6.3 
Table 5.13. The production costs for insourcing and outsourcing jobs (with one of 
the vendors raises the prices unreasonably) 、 ） ‘ ^ 
In^hottseproduction,, Q •； • 'tfj 
Vendor 1 _ ^ ^ ^ " 0 � �狐 l O； 
Vendor 2 � 
0 | ‘ r | ’ > f M � O / 
ft We 5.14. The job assignment with the original model 
(assigned : {I}; not assigned 教{0}) 、二 , 
^ | i 卜 隨 
In-house production 0 ^ ^ 奪黎、•驅 
Vendor 1 0 丄 巡 臺 臺 
^ r m M m M 
IVible 5.15. The revised job assignment with the Umlt^  powcr.ofsthc vendojr^  
-.、歡、；：：、‘、、.二 > ‘‘ 
(assigned {1}； not assigned«{0}) ‘ ‘ 众‘• 孤 
Both models try to avoid assigning jobs to vendor 1 due to the expensive 
production costs and assign the jobs to the appropriate vendors. The original 
model (table 5.14) suggests the client to have four jobs outsourced to vendor 2 
due to cost reduction; however, this will empower the control of the single 
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vendor. On the other hand, to better control over the IS activities, the revised 
model with the limited power of the vendors (table 5.15) now decides to have 
jobs 1 and 2 outsourced to vendor 2 and job 5 to vendor 3. And the company 
should maintain job 3 and 4 for in-house production. The total costs become 
$26,071 millions (with the limitation on the power of the vendors) and 
$25,896 millions with the original model. 
Obviously, the original model would enhance the lower outsourcing costs due 
to the cheaper purchasing prices offered by vendor 2. However, since the 
original model suggests the client to outsource four of the five job functions to 
vendor 2 and have only one job done by in-house, this decision will bring us 
back to the single vendor approach. The high dependence and reliance on the 
single vendor may induce extra monitoring costs which may exceed the direct 
savings. The company may lead to shut-down due to the failure in the 
performance of the single vendor. Therefore, the revised model prevails in this 
particular condition since the job functions are equally distributed to the 
appropriate production unit. 
In single vendor approach described in section 4.4，the client was forced to 
pay for the high purchasing prices and choose the expensive vendor since 
there are no other choices. On the other hand, in the multiple approach, the 
client is now free to choose the appropriate vendors and avoid paying the 
expensive bill. Applegate and Montealegre (1991) and Cross (1995) also 
argued that single vendor could lead to a higher switching cost due to the 
higher risk in opportunism. On the other hand, multiple vendor approach is 
superior to it. Although multiple vendors might require higher coordination 
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cost and managerial efforts, outsourcing with multiple vendors would induce 
greater bargaining power to lower the purchasing price and hence achieve the 
higher level of performance due to the competitive environment. Also, 
multiple vendors enhance a higher operational flexibility since different 
vendors have different specialties in their technical services. 
5.4.5 The same purchasing prices 
We assume that the cost for the in-house production would be the same as the 
purchasing prices offered by the vendors (see table 5.16) which gives Ci=dik. 
The extra manufacturing and correlation among the job functions will be 
critical to the outsourcing decision. 
Cost in Million 1 2 �^ 3 务！禽，:4 .f 5 ： -
In-house production 10 9.9 j o i ^ f f ^ � 3 . 2 / 6.8 •  
Vendor 1 : 10 9,9 ,, >，0.5 、：— 於一 6.8^ 
Vendor 2 赦10 T" 9.9 ‘ ] 二 3.2 � 
Vendor 3 10 9.9 ��0.5,， 3.2 6.8 
Table 5.16 The production costs for insourcing and outsourcing jobs (with the same pricing)被 
When we have insourcing cost equal to the purchasing prices, the outsourcing 
decision will rely on the two critical parameters 一 the expected extra 
manufacturing costs and the correlation of jobs. The extra manufacturing costs 
were determined by the managers according to the vendor selection criteria. 
From the vendor performance matrix, users can clearly identify which vendor 
persists the least extra costs for governing and monitoring. Another critical 
factor- correlation of jobs governs the coordination between the two particular 
jobs in terms of their inter-dependence. It determines which combination of 
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jobs would persist the least cost and effect according to the five possible 
situations which is described in section 5.1.3. Resolving the stated problem 
with our original model, the optimal solution is obtained and presented in 
table 5.17. Since the decision is constrained with the limited resources of the 
firm, the outsourcer does not have the capability to have all the jobs done by 
in-house and have to outsource some of the functions even they are higher in 
the extra manufacturing costs and the cost for correlation among the jobs. 
TOBS . |l ” � 
lo-houseproduction ‘ 了爾瑟 j j 麗 
Vendor 1 0 � 0 c '， 0 � 
Vendor 2 0 i f t \ : , 0 �鶴 承 
liable 5.17 The optimal solution to the original model wlth the same p i ^ g 
(assigned = {!}; not assigned {0}) 
Our model recommends the client to have job 2 done by in-house and job 1, 3, 
4 and 5 outsourced to vendor 3. The parameter -correlation of job identifies 
which job is strategic to the company and possesses a great effect or 
competency to the company; and therefore, the model decides to have job 3 
done by in-house. On the other hand, since vendor 3 gives the lowest extra 
manufacturing costs in the vendor performance matrix and the lowest 
correlation cost in coordinating the outsourcing activities, the model decides 
to outsource the four job functions to vendor 3 particularly. The total costs 
become $32.441 millions. 
In fact, the vendor performance matrix is an application to analyze and 
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compare vendors' performance at the three different operating conditions-
good, fair or poor. It also facilitates as a tool for sensitivity analysis. It 
determines the potential impact on costs due to deviation of the probabilities 
other than predicated such that unfavorable or risky conditions can be 
identified and the contingency plans can be developed. Besides, the 
outsourcers can implement the vendor selection strategies such that they can 
distinguish the most appropriate vendor at the specific situation (Soukup 
1987). 
In the previous example, the vendor performance matrix can clearly identify 
the appropriate vendor based on the expected extra manufacturing costs such 
that the model decides to outsource the jobs to vendor 3 particularly. Perhaps, 
the matrix predicts that vendors 1 and 2 may induce high extra monitoring and 
governing costs in the post-contractual period. They are failed to be selected 
for the job assignments. Therefore, the assignment to the probabilities of 
reaching the respective performance level for each vendor is critical in 
evaluating their performance. The assignments should be determined 
according to the marketing research, statistics, sales and top management and 
updated periodically to reflect the current forecasts and increase the client's 
ability to respond (Soukup 1987). 
However, this prior decision will bring us back to the unfavorable single 
vendor condition again since the model decides outsourcing four of the five IS 
functions to vendor 3 only. Therefore, to avoid a particular vendor from being 
over-powered, we should resolve the problem again with the limited power of 
the vendors. The revised solution is shown in table 5.18 and a more competent 
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strategy for the job assignments can be achieved. Now, the client will keep job 
2 and 3 done by in-house and outsource job 1 to vendor 1 and the other two 
jobs to vendor 3. The total costs become $32,618 millions. 
J O B S � :. |l : � 卜 丨 沖 竊p 翻 
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Table 5.18 The revised job assignment with the limited power of the 
vendors (with the same purchasing pricing) (assigned == { l^not a s s i g ^ j 
{0}) 蒙 . “ ^ ^ P 
5.4.6 Evaluation of vendors 'performance 
5.4,6.1 Data Envelopment Analysis 
In section 5.1.2.1, a vendor performance matrix was developed to evaluate the 
expected extra manufacturing costs that may be generated according the 
vendor selection criteria. In our evaluation scheme, we use dollars as the 
objective criteria and focus on the extra manufacturing costs of doing the 
business with the vendors. In fact, the vendor evaluation program can not only 
be cost-based but also be applied to other discretionary criteria such as 
efficiency, punctuality, ease or speed of the vendors. We can also select the 
vendors according to their abilities and capabilities to cope with design 
changes and the different conditions deviated from the purchase requests. 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is another popular technique for vendor 
selection process. Some efficiency-based vendor selection and negotiation 
models based on DEA have been developed to deal with several important 
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vendor attributes such as price, quality, delivery performance and 
customization (Weber and Desai, 1996, Weber et al, 1998 and Zhu, 2002). 
With DEA, users can obtain the relative efficiencies of the vendors by 
comparing their multiple attributes -inputs and outputs such that users can 
clearly identify the vendor with the best-practice. The use of DEA for vendor 
selection process will be further discussed in Chapter 6. 
5.4.6.2 Vendor selection problem 
Instead of using the weighting scheme, we can also formulate a vendor 
selection problem to estimate the expected extra manufacturing costs that may 
induce due to the vendors' performance. The extra expected manufacturing 
costs can be evaluated as a function of the past performance and the skill sets 
that a particular vendor k may have specifically suitable for the assigned job 
function i. The past performance history can be found from their delivery 
performance, flexibility in accommodating the terms in the contract or the 
conformity to specification. And we can also estimate if the particular vendor 
has the capability to satisfy the requirement of the tasks and the ability to 
improve the performance such as the capacity of the database, networking and 
the access of the innovative technology such that these criteria would lower 
the extra manufacturing cost when governing the task. 
h 汰=/{past _ performance, skill _ sets) 
K =gik +Pik 
gik = extra manufacturing cost that may generate due to the 
performance history of the vendor k to perform job i\ 
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hik= extra manufacturing cost that may generate due to the skill sets 
that vendor k may have to improve the performance of job i. 
5.4.7 Make the unfair fair 
If the outsourcer would just like to have one particular vendor to be selected 
for the job assignment intentionally and neglect all other candidates, he may 
make some tricks on the parameter on parameter -the extra manufacturing 
cost such that this will force the model to select the particular vendor. Hence, 
only one vendor could fulfill the requirement in the selection process and the 
potential vendor gives the least extra costs but the others will induce a high 
extra cost which will be rejected. The artificial treatment on the /z,it parameter 
could make unfair fair. 
5.4.8 Applications 
The multiple vendor model is not just limited to IS outsourcing practices. In 
fact, it can be generalized to other outsourcing applications. For example, a 
manager may decide to outsource their training programs, administrative 
processes or accounting services to outsiders which may not involve IT. Yet, 
we can still use our model to evaluate the outsourcing decision with the 
objective of minimizing all the possible insourcing and outsourcing costs. 
Likewise, we can also estimate the extra manufacturing costs that may involve 
according to the vendors' performance and determine the interdependence 
among the functions in order to find the optimal solution for the job 
assignments. Moreover, the models can be applicable to other industry such as 
airline, hospital or transportation. 
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5.5 Concluding Remarks 
As discussed in Chapter 4，single vendor approach seems an insufficient and 
ineffective strategy for the outsourcers as single vendor has higher risk in 
opportunism. To avoid the vendor from shirking, multiple vendor approach 
prevails. The multiple vendor model also aims at minimizing all the possible 
insourcing and outsourcing costs with the consideration of the 
inter-dependence among the jobs using the Mixed Integer Programming. In 
addition, the outsourcing decisions will be evaluated with variety of vendors. 
Indeed, the model gives an optimal solution to the assignment of jobs which 
considers not only the minimal costs but also the vendor selection process. A 
numerical example and the managerial concerns are also presented in this 
chapter. They show that the multiple vendor approach is superior to the single 
vendor one since multiple vendor approach would induce a competition in the 
market and the potential of opportunism is reduced. Greater competition 
would also enhance lower bids, better services and more satisfactory 
performance. Moreover, the client can avoid from paying the expensive bill 
when one single vendor raises the purchasing price unreasonably in the 
multiple vendor approach. 
From the framework we developed in chapter 3，we found that there were 
many complex issues involved in outsourcing, from which we select one of 
the important issues -outsourcing with minimal costs and introduce it by 
developing a quantitative model. We apply some of critical factors such as 
coordination and degree of outsourcing in the framework towards our model 
and assume that cost is the most dominant factor in outsourcing practices. The 
model is simple yet realistic towards the outsourcing environment. The 
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optimal solution can really identify the jobs with the least costs and less 
effects on other job functions. However, there is still limitation towards our 
model. In our model formulation, we assume that the correlation and 
interdependence between any two jobs exist in outsourcing. In practice, the 
interdependence may involve more than two jobs which may present a 
multi-dimensional relationship rather than pair-wise relationship. Yet, it is 
difficult and complicated to formulate a multi-dimensional problem and solve 
it by an exact method. One way to solve it is to use heuristic methods where 
we can obtain a heuristic solution by swapping the job assignments 
determined from our model and repeat the swapping process until no 
improvement is achieved. The extension towards our model using the 
heuristic methods will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Since there is no representative model to understand the outsourcing 
phenomena, we thereby hope to shed a light on the complicated outsourcing 
ventures from quantitative perspective and initiate this research direction. 
We will discuss the extension towards our model and provide our synthesis on 




Many researchers have studied how to outsource the IS activities effectively 
and efficiently for more than 30 years. However, the literature was too broad 
and rather diverse. Our first job is to develop an outsourcing framework to 
show a comprehensive view to understand outsourcing decisions which is 
described in chapter 3. Since a well-planned and organized outsourcing would 
reduce the level of risks and likely be successful in the business (Bryce and 
Useen, 1998)，our framework also facilitates as a full preparation and 
organized plan for designing an outsourcing project. More importantly, it 
identifies not only the main considerations and aspects the clients need to 
concern when planning the outsourcing decisions but also demonstrates the 
future research directions and identifies the areas that are rarely addressed in 
the literature. In fact, only few researchers examine the possible risks and 
uncertainty that may arise during outsourcing (such as coordination of jobs 
and vendor selection). 
6.1 Extension to heuristic method 
In the thesis, we have introduced the quantitative models that will quantify 
and estimate the loss due to those possible risks that may be arisen from 
disruption of service, vendors' underperformance or mis-coordination among 
the IS functions by applying some of the crucial factors in the framework. 
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Although these models can clearly identify which jobs should be outsourced 
with the lowest cost and least effect on others in both the single and multiple 
vendor approaches, there is still limitation towards our models. 
In our model formulation, we assume that the correlation and interdependence 
exist between any two jobs in outsourcing activities. However, in practice，the 
interdependence may involve more than two jobs which may present a 
multi-dimensional relationship rather than a linear pair-wise relationship. 
Outsourcing decisions will then consider across several jobs which behave 
different natures and the problem becomes generalized. Yet, it is difficult and 
complicated to formulate a multi-dimensional problem and solve it by an 
exact method. One way to solve it is to use heuristic methods where we can 
obtain a heuristic solution by swapping the job assignments determined from 
our model and repeat the swapping process until no improvement is achieved. 
The computerized methodology for solving this problem can be found by Lin 
and Kemighan (1972)，where the authors developed a highly efficient 
heuristic algorithm based on a substantial generalization of the interchange 
transformation. This heuristic method can generate optimum and 
near-optimum solutions for the symmetric traveling salesman problem with 
high frequency since it always finds the right elements to exchange. Moreover, 
it is widely applicable to different traveling salesman problems and indeed an 
ideal way to solve our complex and practical outsourcing problems. 
6.2 Economy of scales 
In outsourcing practices, some vendors may propose to give discounts on the 
second deals in order to attract more business. The outsourcer may then 
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decide to assign more jobs to the discounted vendor in order to achieve the 
economy of scales since it is more efficient and cost-effective to achieve the 
production by larger scales. In fact, different bargaining factors such as the 
discounting factor can be incorporated into our model so as to find the most 
appealing and cost-effective production units to accomplish the outsourcing 
tasks. 
6.3 Data Envelopment Analysis 
6.3.1 Vendor selection process 
In section 5.1.2.1，we developed a vendor performance matrix to estimate the 
expected extra manufacturing costs that may be generated according the 
vendor's performance history for the vendor selection process. In our 
evaluation scheme, we use dollars as the objective criteria and focus on the 
extra manufacturing costs dealing with the vendors. In fact, the vendor 
evaluation program can not only be cost-based but also be applied to other 
discretionary criteria such as efficiency, punctuality, ease or speed of the 
vendors. We can also select the vendors according to their abilities and 
capabilities to cope with design changes and the different conditions deviated 
from the purchase requests. 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is another popular technique for vendor 
selection process. It can incorporate both discretionary and non-discretionary 
factors into the model to evaluate the efficiency of the vendors (DMUs). In 
fact, some efficiency-based vendor selection and negotiation models based on 
DEA have been developed to deal with several important vendor attributes 
such as price, quality, delivery performance and customization (Weber and 
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Desai, 1996，Weber et al., 1998 and Zhu, 2002). With DBA, users can obtain 
the relative efficiencies of the vendors by comparing their multiple 
attributes -inputs and outputs such that users can clearly identify the vendor 
with the best-practice. 
6.3.2 Outsourcing decisions 
On the other hand, DEA can also be used for evaluating the outsourcing 
decisions. Yet, researchers seldom used this method to address the outsourcing 
situations in the literature. In fact, DEA is an ideal method to access the 
complicated outsourcing process since it can incorporate both discretionary 
and non-discretionary factors such as market price, vendors' properties, the 
environmental factors- growth factor and risk rating as well as the managerial 
preference into the models. Indeed, it can give a thorough analysis in 
evaluating the performance efficiency of the DMUs and identify the best one 
to perform the task. 
6.4 Vendors 'point of view in winning the contracts 
In this research, we only focus on investigating the outsourcing decisions 
from the outsourcer's point of view but not the vendor's point of view. In the 
future direction, we suggest to examine the outsourcing decisions from the 
vendors' point of view and study vendors' strategy in order to maximize their 
chance in winning the contract in a condition that the vendors do not know the 
model formulation and vice versa. 
6.4,1 Do not know the model formulation 
If the vendors do not know the model formulation of making the outsourcing 
90 
decision, they may assume that that cost reduction is the key factor in winning 
the bid. They may try to lower their purchasing price whereas the lowest 
bound is the cost in developing and establishing the particular investment. 
Hence, the vendor may try to lower their costs as much as possible, which 
may include the material costs, equipment costs, labor costs, expertise costs 
which take part of advising or organizing the event, consultant fee and legal 
fee. The vendors may move their company to China or other developing 
countries in order to get the cheap labor and low material costs. The 
aggressive vendors may even target a zero profit margin in order to win the 
bid. This would not shut down the firm as the purchasing price has already 
included entrepreneur costs; hence, the profit margin is optional. They may 
also predict how their competitors would offer the price according to their past 
history and estimate how they could give a lower bid. 
6.4.2 Know the model formulation 
If the vendors know the formulation of deciding the outsourcing job 
assignment, they will understand that other than offering a low purchasing 
price, the quality of services is also important in selection process. They know 
that the firm has to have a good reputation and performance history as well as 
high skill sets in order to win the bids. In addition to lower their cost as much 
as possible, they will try to maximize their reputation, credibility, efficiency 
and profession in order to fulfill the requirement in the vendor selection 
process and attract the outsourcer to select them. 
6.5 Risk Analysis 
In addition to the decision models for the evaluation on the outsourcing 
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decisions, we would also like to provide other potential outsourcing research 
topics which are interesting to be investigated. For example, risk analysis 
during the outsourcing transaction is a very challenging research issue to be 
examined. Since different kinds of risks such as opportunism risk or 
technology diffusion risk may appear in IS outsourcing practices, however, 
researchers only clarify the possibility of the risk but not evaluate the risk 
assessment and management on an investment or outsourcing an IS project. In 
fact, risk assessment is seldom analyzed quantitatively since it is implicit and 
hard to evaluate in all areas. Aubert et. al (1998) used the AHP to examine the 
various risk factors that are linked to undesirable outcomes to IT outsourcing. 
Researcher may further investigate the dynamics of risk using probabilities or 
stochastic approach to quantify the risk-aversion and estimate the resultant 
cost that may arise due to the risk of outsourcing. 
6.6 Outsourcing failure 
However, even though we have made all the consideration in planning an 
outsourcing function and found an optimal solution to our outsourcing 
decision, there would still be other managerial concerns such as unrealistic 
expectations or unfamiliarity in outsourcing market which make the 
outsourcing fail. A 1995 report by The Standish Group International Inc. 
showed that only 16.2 percent of the outsourcing projects were succeeded and 
completed on time and on budget. More than 31 percent of which were failed 
and cancelled (Haubold 2000). Despite of these discouraging figures, the 
literature is lack of failure examples since companies are reluctant to talk 
about their outsourcing problems (Laabs 1998). Since organizational factors 
are most critical in outsourcing aspects, it is important for us to investigate the 
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most critical factors in determining outsourcing failure. As companies are 
reluctant to give these sensitive data, case studies might be an appropriate 
method to figure out what would determine a failure. 
In fact, there were couples of published papers understanding the outsourcing 
failure using the case study approach. Some researchers have investigated the 
main reasons for the firms to fail in outsourcing deals. Maclnnis (2003) and 
Haubold (2000) found that they are unrealistic expectations from the clients, 
inability to measure the level of performance both of the client and the 
vendors, the unclear map of the objectives or inadequate definition on the 
requirement of the outsourcing job and outsourcing the wrong projects. Laabs 
((1998) also suggested the biggest reasons for outsourcing failure are lack of 
proactiveness by vendors, turnover of the vendor, vendor errors and mistakes, 
incompatibility between client and vendor cultures, data transmission errors, 
technological inefficiencies and contract ambiguities. Laabs (1998) also 
argued that the most troublesome is that the outsourcing projects are often 
under-managed and poorly monitored since clients often have the difficulties 
in defining their service levels which affect the realities of control. 
On the other hand, researchers also studied the preparation in outsourcing 
projects in order to avoid failure. Laabs (1998) and Maclnnis (2003) agreed 
that a "good" partnership has to be maintained with the service providers 
rather than contractual relationship. Haubolds(2000) suggested that the 
outsourcing projects have to be specific. For example, the client should have 
scheduled the timetable, monitored the vendors' performance from the agreed 
requirement and addressed the consequences and instilled the penalties of a 
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failed project. Haubolds (2000) and Hendry (1995) also argued that the client 
can be informal for the in-house production but has to document everything 
when they outsourced so as to ensure the understanding on the expectations 
by both parties. 
Although managers often complained about the downside of outsourcing and 
retrieved what they have outsourced back to in-house, research evidence 
indicated that a well designed and well managed outsourcing could reduce the 
outsourcing cost, enhance the competitive advantage and enlarge the stock 
value [Bryce and Useen (1998), Soukup (1987)]. Moreover, due to the 
specialties and the low cost production given by the vendors, companies have 
still seen outsourcing as a solution to solve their outsourcing problems. 
Williamsons (1979) also claimed that production costs are often lower with 
outsourcing since the vendors achieve the economy of scales through mass 
production and labor specialization. Vendors can often save costs by 
allocating the fixed costs over more units of products and they are most 
expertise since they only focus on the tasks which they are most proficient. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no research evidence to 
analyze the pattern of failure in outsourcing. We could carry out an analysis to 
figure out what factors would contribute to a failure or success according to 
the company's outsourcing strategy and performance. Through the analysis, it 
would be interesting for us to investigate if the outsourcing failure is related to 
the discretionary or non-discretionary factors such as the size of the 
outsourcing projects, the job nature, environmental instability or the firm age. 
Thereby, the company can clearly identify the potential factors that may lead 
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to outsourcing failure and be aware of them. 
We hope that these potential research topics will give the researchers and 
practitioners some new insights in the future research endeavor. As a result, 
companies would not only obtain the optimal solution towards outsourcing 
decisions but also understand what other concerns they need to make in order 
to achieve a successful outsourcing, which would bring us to a more 




Information System outsourcing practices have been seen as a way for the 
firms to stay competitive. Many researchers have studied how to outsource the 
IS activities effectively and efficiently for more than 30 years. Because of the 
complicated issues involved, research has examined outsourcing issues from 
different perspectives. Few analytical models have been used to understand 
how the decisions are made. Therefore, in this research, we have developed 
both qualitative and quantitative models to explain the outsourcing 
phenomena. 
In the thesis, our first task is to structure the literature by developing a 
comprehensive framework in order to get an overview on IS outsourcing. The 
framework will be useful to the users in analyzing IS outsourcing with the 
identification of all the major factors and determinants that may influence the 
outsourcing costs. It shows the ‘governing, or hidden costs could be arisen 
from four different areas and one should consider all the factors involving 
these four categories- economics, managerial concerns, strategy and vendor 
issues before making the outsourcing decisions. These four areas are 
interrelated and can be regarded as the major aspects in outsourcing IS 
activities. Indeed, the framework will distinguish the importance on 
outsourcing and can also be facilitated as a tool for planning outsourcing 
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activities. 
With the help of our framework, the mathematical models are proposed to 
evaluate the outsourcing decisions in both single and multiple vendor cases. 
Surprisingly, few research studies in the literature use a quantitative model to 
understand outsourcing decisions. Our work is to develop the decision models 
to analyze the decisions systematically using the Mixed Integer Programming. 
Our quantitative models would implement some of the crucial factors 
suggested in the framework and make the estimation that may implicitly or 
explicitly influence the outsourcing costs. In our model formulation, we 
assume that cost efficiency is the most critical factor in evaluating outsourcing 
decision. Our objective is to minimize all the possible insourcing and 
outsourcing costs with the consideration of the inter-dependence among the 
jobs in both cases. 
In this research, firstly we investigate the single vendor situation in 
outsourcing practices and find that the single vendor approach seems to be 
insufficient and inefficient due to in-competitive market. If the vendor raises 
the purchasing prices dramatically, the model reacts passively since the 
outsourcer is "locked" into one vendor and is forced to pay for the expensive 
production costs. Moreover, the single vendor often has the potential to shirk 
or be opportunistic and may negotiate changes in the contract. On the other 
hand, in multiple vendor approach, the outsourcers will have more vendors to 
choose from and a greater bargaining power to lower the purchasing price and 
hence achieve the higher level of performance. Also, multiple vendors 
enhance a higher operational flexibility since different vendors have different 
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specialties in their technical services. 
Therefore, our second research problem is to integrate the multiple vendor 
situation into our model. In fact, in practices, companies often deal with 
multi-vendors rather than a single vendor. In the multi-vendor consideration, 
we will have more options on choosing an appropriate vendor which give us 
more flexibility and vendors' performance becomes very critical to the vendor 
selection process. If the vendors have the possibility to be opportunistic, the 
extra manufacturing cost could be dominant in the outsourcing costs. Besides, 
the inter-dependence and coordination of any two jobs will be significant and 
complicated in the multiple vendor approach since different vendors could 
have different capabilities and performance levels. An inappropriate 
combination of assigning the two jobs could induce a very high coordination 
cost. 
Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the decision model with both 
single vendor and multiple vendor approach and solved by the Excel Solver. 
Both models give out the optimal solution to the assignment of IS functions 
which not only considers the production cost but also the governing costs such 
as expected extra manufacturing cost due to the performance level of jobs and 
the associated cost due to the inter-dependence of jobs. Moreover, these 
mathematical models only require modest computational effort and the use of 
Excel Solver can ease the communication and enable us to conduct a quick 
sensitivity analysis by changing the figures on the parameters in the 
spreadsheet. Indeed, it is easily adopted and widely-used in the computer 
applications. 
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The managerial implications are also presented in both single and multiple 
vendor situations and show that the multiple vendor approach is superior to 
the single vendor one in managing the outsourcing activities since multiple 
vendor approach would induce a competition in the market and the potential 
of opportunism is reduced. Greater competition would also enhance lower 
bids, better services and more satisfactory performance. Moreover, the client 
can avoid from paying the expensive bill even if one of the vendors raises the 
purchasing price unreasonably in the multiple vendor approach. Indeed, these 
implications can give the new insights to the managers and explore different 
outsourcing situations such that manager can find the most adoptive strategy 
suitable for their company. 
In fact, the decision models are not just limited to IS outsourcing practices. It 
can be generalized to other outsourcing applications. For example, a manager 
may decide to outsource their training programs, administrative processes or 
accounting services to outsiders which may not involve IT. Yet, we can still 
use our model to evaluate the outsourcing decision with the objective of 
minimizing all the possible insourcing and outsourcing costs. Likewise, we 
can also estimate the extra manufacturing costs that may involve according to 
the vendor selection criteria and determine the interdependence among the 
functions in order to find the optimal solution for the job assignments. 
Moreover, the models can be applicable to other industry such as airline, 
hospital or transportation. 
Although our suggested decision models are simple yet realistic towards the 
outsourcing environment, the optimal solution can really identify the jobs with 
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the least costs and less effects on other job functions. However, there is still 
limitation towards our model. In our model formulation, we assume that the 
correlation and interdependence between any two jobs exist in outsourcing. In 
practice, the interdependence may involve more than two jobs which may 
present a multi-dimensional relationship rather than a linear pair-wise 
relationship. Yet, it is difficult and complicated to formulate a 
multi-dimensional problem and solve it by an exact method. One way to solve 
it is to use heuristic methods where we can obtain a heuristic solution by 
swapping the job assignments determined from our model and repeat the 
swapping process until no improvement is achieved. 
In order to get a more completed analysis on outsourcing practices, future 
studies on the evaluating the outsourcing decision using heuristic methods or 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the investigation on outsourcing 
failure are proposed. Besides, risk analysis on outsourcing which is less 
emphasized in the literature is another challenge for the researchers to 
examine. Also, it is interesting for us to investigate the outsourcing decisions 
from the vendors' point of view in order to get a more completed view in 
making the decisions. We will hope all the suggested research agenda will 
give the researchers and practitioners some new insights in the future research 
endeavor. Since there is no representative model to explain the outsourcing 
phenomena, we thereby hope to shed a light on the complicated outsourcing 




Categories/ Factors Literature Main Argument 
Ang et al. 1998 The transaction costs can be determined by Economy Mcfarlan et al. 1995 asset specificity and the level of environmental 
Williamson 1979 and behavioral uncertainty.  
Roodhooft et al. Asset specificity is critical to outsourcing Asset Specificity 1999 decision. Products with high asset specificity 
Vining et al. 1999 could raise the outsourcing costs.  
„ . J « Nywenyama et al. Greater uncertainties could induce higher Environmental & 1999 bargaining cost during the contract negotiation. 
Behavioral Vining et al. 1999 Uncertainties concerning vendors' performance 
. might give rise to a switching cost when the uncertainty vendor were underperformed or failed.  
Bendor et al.l985 Vendor selection is a major aspect on 
Burton 1988 outsourcing acts since purchased products from Vendor Issue vendors constitute a large percentage of the 
total product costs.  
Vining et al. 1999 Low contestable market increased the risk of 
Availability opportunism since the service was hardly 
replaced.  
Kim 2000 Vendors with higher improvement capabilities 
. Soukup 1987 would have the potential to reduce the future 
Capabilities supply cost and cope with the reasonable 
deviations from the contracts.  
Barthelemy et al. High level of performance from the vendors is 
2001 one of the main motivations to IT outsourcing. 
Gregory 1986 Researchers used different weighing models to ferjormance Lamberson 1976 evaluate vendors' performance for vendor 
Mazurak 1986 selection process. 
Wind et al. 1968 
Bendor et al. 1985 An appropriate strategy in purchasing function 
s t r a t e g y could mitigate the effects of uncertainties.  
“Flanagan 2000 Keep the highly skilled and specialized 
Nywenyama et al. personnel to concentrate on the core Competency 1999 competence and outsource the non-core 
Vecca 2000 functions. 
Williams 1998 
Dutta 1996 Lacity et al. suggested that selective 
Lacity et al. 1998 outsourcing could provide more flexibility and 
control over the IS functions whereas total Degree outsourcing persists a higher risk in losing the 
control. Dutta found that two example banks 
both succeeded in outsourcing with two 
different methods.  
Cole-Gomolski Short- term contracts could minimize 
1999b uncertainty and enable the firms to choose 
p . , f 广 Lacity et al. 1993 different vendors to adopt the sudden demands, 尸erioas oj Contracts Monczka et al. peaks or design requirement. However, 
1988 Monczka et al. argued that long term  
relationship could enhance cost reduction.  
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Applegate et al. Nywenyama suggested that single vendor 
1991 approach would be superior to multiple 
Number of Vendors Cross 1995 vendors and incentive scheme could induce 
Nywenyama et al. the single vendor to achieve higher 
1999 performance. However, Applegate et al. and 
Cross argued that single vendor would lead to 
higher switching cost.  
jyi • I Malone et al. 1994 The management of outsourcing activities is 
^ Van de Ven et al. required for an effective control over the Concerns 1976 process.  
Coordination Dutta 1996 M a n a g i n g t h e i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e ~ ^ 
Hendry 1995 outsourcing activities and establishing a strong 
Malone et al. 1994 co-ordination between the vendors and clients 
Meyer 2000 was important to accomplish the tasks. Hendry 
Van de Ven et al. and Meyer suggested that insourcing could 
1976 ensure consistency and coordination within the  
in-house production.  
Partnership Goles et al. 2002 Partnership enhances the client and the service 
Lee et al. 2002 providers to co-operate in order to achieve 
mutual benefits. Due to the exchange of 
valuable resources in outsourcing, their 
relationships are based on mutual trusts rather  
than self-interests only.  
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